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Executive Summary 
Greater Toronto is recognized as a high-performing urban region. Over the past decade, 
however, negative social, economic, and environmental trends have emerged that threaten 
the region’s future. On the basis of documentary research and four focus group workshops 
with a diverse array of professional practitioners, this paper assesses the Toronto region’s 
current assets and vulnerabilities in relation to future risks. The discussion is framed by the 
concept of resilience—an increasingly popular, yet abstract, concept in urban planning and 
public administration. This paper proposes, first, that planning and policymaking be 
directed toward increasing the region’s resilience, understood as the diversity and 
redundancy of social, economic, environmental, and fiscal-governmental systems. Second, 
it suggests that public resource allocation be guided by what some have called anticipatory 
governance—the proactive use of scenarios to discover where multiple risks and 
vulnerabilities intersect, and therefore where returns may be greatest. Finally, the paper 
suggests that an appeal to improving quality of life rather than to crisis or individual self-
interest may be the most effective way to build broad support for long-term investments in 
resilience-enhancing infrastructure and services.  
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Introduction 
The Toronto region is at a pivot point. There is a sense that it has arrived on the world 
stage—that it is a high-performing and rapidly growing global city with an enviable 
economic, social, and environmental record. Toronto routinely scores near the top of 
international quality-of-life and business climate rankings. Over the past decade, however, 
worrisome trends have emerged that may threaten the region’s future performance: rising 
rates of poverty and socio-economic inequality, lagging innovation and productivity, a 
growing infrastructure deficit, inadequate social and economic integration of new 
Canadians, and concern about the adaptability of the region’s built and natural 
environments to rising energy costs, climate change, and an ageing society. All of these and 
more pose difficult and unresolved policy dilemmas for all levels of government.  
It is in this context that the Project on Regional Resilience was initiated with 
support from the Ontario Growth Secretariat and the Toronto chapter of the Urban Land 
Institute to provide an integrated diagnosis of the challenges the region faces and spur 
creative thinking on how best to respond to them. The investigation of the region’s 
challenges, assets, and vulnerabilities synthesizes research by academics, governments, and 
non-profit organizations with the findings of four thematic workshops with diverse groups 
of professionals selected on the basis of their area of expertise. This project is not a 
benchmarking exercise. It is not intended to systematically compare the performance of 
the Toronto region to that of other regions. Indeed, there is no shortage of such city 
ranking studies (see Taylor 2011). Rather, the intention is to develop a “within-case” 
perspective on the region’s strengths, weaknesses, and threats. 
The discussion is framed in terms of resilience. Resilience is a useful approach to 
urban policy because it recognizes complexity, interconnectedness, and uncertainty, all of 
which cloud the ability of planners and policymakers to anticipate, mitigate, or otherwise 
respond to present and future challenges. Although resilience is an increasingly influential 
concept in public policy and planning, it is often discussed in the abstract and there are 
divergent perspectives on its practical application. In addition to exploring Toronto’s 
current conditions and future potential, this paper also contributes to local and 
international debates in planning and public policy by presenting a practice-oriented 
model of urban resilience.  
The paper places special emphasis on policymaking for the built and natural 
environments for two reasons. First, the physical city, with its buildings, roads, rails, pipes, 
wires, and open spaces, is the container for social and economic life. The construction of 
the urban built and natural environment is a largely irreversible process. As its structure 
shapes human behaviour—how we live, interact with others, move, work, and play—and, 
ultimately, prosperity and quality of life, it is important that planners and policymakers 
make the best possible decisions regarding its design. Second, the project was initiated in 
the context of a now completed coordinated review of provincial land-use policies 
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(Ontario 2015). To contribute to the review, a series of focus-group workshops with 
expert practitioners was financially supported by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing with a Places to Grow Implementation Grant. An earlier draft of this paper was 
presented to the Ministry as an input to the review. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 lays out a practice-
oriented definition of resilience and how it can be applied in public policy for urban 
regions. On the basis of the practitioner workshops and background research, Part 2 uses 
the resilience framework to inventory the Toronto region’s assets and vulnerabilities in 
relation to future challenges, with a particular focus on the built environment. Finally, 
Part 3 draws on the workshop discussions to reflect on the political challenge of selling 
resilience to a skeptical public. The paper concludes with a reflection on applying 
resilience-oriented planning and policymaking in the Ontario context. 
1. Governing for resilience 
Governments, private-sector consultants, non-profit organizations, and academics have in 
recent years embraced resilience as an organizing principle for urban policy and planning. 
The term is used in different ways, however, so it is worth examining its meaning. 
What is resilience?  
The application of resilience to the urban and metropolitan contexts is a recent 
phenomenon that has emerged from a variety of sources. In the natural and applied 
sciences, resilience is conceptualized as a measurable intrinsic property of a substance or 
system (see Holling 1996). Engineers have long studied the relative capacity of materials to 
return to their original state after being exposed to stress. Biologists and ecologists have 
examined how ecosystems maintain their essential functions despite disturbance. 
Psychologists have studied the determinants of the capacity to respond to stress and trauma 
of individual people and in particular children (Werner 1989). Social scientists’ application 
of resilience is often more metaphorical. Economists and economic geographers have 
studied the determinants of urban economies’ rapid recovery and growth in the context of 
recession (Christopherson, Michie, and Tyler 2010; Pike, Dawley, and Tomaney 2010). 
Similarly, resilience has emerged as a guiding concept in natural disaster preparedness. 
There is some evidence of convergence among approaches. For example, socio-ecological 
systems researchers have probed the interaction of human society and natural 
environments, particularly in relation to climate change adaptation (Boyd and Folke 2012).  
 Urban resilience—the resilience of cities, broadly defined—is typically portrayed as 
a property or capacity of urban economies, societies, and environments. For example, the 
Urban Land Institute’s Urban Resilience Program, the Brookings Institution and the 
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MacArthur Foundation’s Building Resilient Regions Network, the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, and the European Union’s TURAS project, among others, have used 
resilience as a metaphor to explore the determinants of an urban region’s successful 
response to predictable and unforeseen challenges. By understanding the determinants of 
resilience, decision makers can assess and design policies to remedy gaps in preparedness. 
The research varies, however, on how it characterizes the operation and outcomes of 
resilience.1  
Three versions of resilience are visible in the literature.  
 
1. Resilience as the capacity to bounce back to normal from external 
shocks. The simplest definition of resilience is the capacity to “bounce back” to an 
initial state after experiencing a traumatic event. In essence, resilient cities may 
bend under stress but do not break, and come out much as they were before. In her 
book The Resilience Dividend (2014), Rockefeller Foundation president Judith 
Rodin defines resilience as the capacity to “prepare for disruptions, to recover from 
shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (3). In this 
vein, the Brookings Institution’s Metro Monitor project measures whether U.S. 
metropolitan areas have returned to their pre-recession levels of total employment, 
unemployment rates, economic output, and average house price (Friedhoff and 
Kulkarni 2014). Focusing on natural disaster, the International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives defines resilience as the ability to “absorb disturbances 
while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning” (ICLEI n.d.). 
Similarly, the Urban Land Institute defines resilience as “the ability to define and 
plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events” 
(McCormick and Marshall 2015: 2). The policy objective in this context is to 
minimize the potential impact of a shock, such as a 100-year flood, by 
“hardening,” or increasing the robustness of, infrastructure systems. 
 
2. Resilience as the capacity to be positively transformed by shocks and 
stresses. Resilience has also been defined as the capacity to transform, or “bounce 
forward,” through crises, arriving at a new stable state that is different from before. 
For example, a resilient urban economy may be restructured by recession, but attain 
higher employment and labour market productivity in the medium to long term. 
The policy objective in this case is to create incentives and transitional supports, 
and make capital investments that encourage positive transformation. For example, 
governments have encouraged the formation of higher-value-added manufacturing 
activities by subsidizing training and skills development, creating tax incentives for 
venture capital investment, and constructing new infrastructure. 
                                            
1 For an comprehensive review of the urban resilience literature, see Meerow et al. (2016). 
8 
 
These are typically described as “equilibrium” models. Both imply that there is stability 
before and after the city experiences an external shock, and that resilience is a capacity that 
determines how quickly it returns to its previous stable condition, or a new one.2 The 
policy and governance challenge is to anticipate potential shocks and recover quickly 
when they occur. A third conceptualization of resilience takes a different approach, 
drawing from ecosystem theory to reject the notion of stable equilibrium altogether: 
 
3. Resilience as a capacity to adapt to risks and uncertainty. Resilient cities 
are complex adaptive systems that continuously adapt to changing conditions. Rather 
than planning for or engineering an optimal future end-state, the governance 
challenge is to accept uncertainty. Policymaking is a learning process of assessing 
and managing risks, while remaining open to a range of possible futures (see Walker 
and Salt 2012).  
 
Understanding the city as an adaptive system means recognizing the interdependence of its 
components. The functioning and performance of the economy, society, and built and 
natural environments are connected in complex ways, and so change in one domain will 
have expected and unexpected ripple effects in others. Managing risks requires an 
appreciation of complexity and the potential for unanticipated consequences. It is in this 
vein that we offer this definition of regional resilience: 
A resilient urban region is one in which public and private authorities have the 
capacity to strategically prepare for unexpected future risks while managing 
avoidable ones. The governance challenge is to create institutions and make policies 
that anticipate and adapt to both slow-moving and sudden changes, while 
recognizing the complex interdependencies between a region’s social organization, 
economy, built and natural environments, and governance. 
Is resilience the same as sustainability? 
Importantly, resilience is conceptually distinct from another buzzword, sustainability. In the 
Brundtland Commission’s (1987) classic definition, “sustainable development … meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
Sustainability is therefore about the wise management of resources to keep things much as they 
are. It is possible to be sustainable without being resilient, although in the context of resource 
depletion and climate change it is often argued that sustainability is a prerequisite of resilience (see 
Atmanagara et al. 2013; Newman, Beatley, and Boyer 2009; Newton and Doherty 2014). 
                                            
2 Pendall et al. (2010) characterize these as the single-equilibrium, or “engineering” model, and the 
multiple-equilibrium, or “ecological” model, respectively. Chandler (2014: 5–6) views the first two 
“equilibrium” models as versions of what he calls “classical” resilience. 
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Types of risk 
Up to this point risk and uncertainty have been discussed in the abstract. If resilience is the 
foundation of an urban region’s capacity to manage risks and cope with uncertainty, it is 
necessary to sketch out what these might be. To do so, we must make distinctions between 
sudden shocks and slow shifts, and also between internal and external sources of risk and 
uncertainty.  
 Sudden shocks are discrete events that put stress on existing urban systems. These 
may include extreme weather events, economic crisis, or the failure of critical 
infrastructure. Slow shifts, by contrast, are slow moving or cumulative sources of stress. 
These may include climate change, long-term economic restructuring processes, 
demographic shifts, pollution, and the ageing of buildings and infrastructure.3 Sudden 
shocks and slow shifts can be driven by internal or external processes. Internal risks and 
sources of uncertainty are generated by the urban region’s characteristics, while external 
risks come from outside. Table 1 lists examples of each permutation.4  
Chelleri et al. (2015) write that resilience-building necessarily engages multiple 
spatial scales and time horizons because risks manifest at different speeds and over different 
territories. Individuals, households, neighbourhoods and urban regions are subject to 
transnational and even global economic and social forces as technological change increases 
the connectedness of places and accelerated flows of capital, goods, and labour. This 
perspective suggests that vulnerability increases at smaller scales. To be sure, local and 
provincial policymakers have varying degrees of influence over each of these categories of 
risk. They have no influence over large-scale external processes such as macroeconomic 
shifts or climate change, although they may be able to anticipate and mitigate their impacts. 
Provincial, regional, and local governments have more direct influence over internal 
factors, such as the state of infrastructure and land use. Unlike capital, labour, and goods, 
the built environment is immobile. It is this immobility that makes it both vulnerable to 
external risks and the key to their mitigation. 
                                            
3 The distinction between sudden shocks and slow shifts corresponds to Pendall et al.’s (2010: 80) 
contrast between “acute shocks” and “chronic slow-burn” challenges. 
4 The boundary between internal and external risks may be blurry. A communicable disease such as 
measles, for example, is more likely to be imported from outside than originate locally, however its spread in 
the local population is a function of internal factors, such as vaccination rates and population density. Also, 
we must recognize that some sudden shocks are the cumulative effect of slow shifts. To cite some examples, 
a housing shortage may be a product of demographic change, an extreme weather event or flood may be the 
result of climate change, and a catastrophic bridge collapse may be the outcome of long-term 
underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance. 
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Table 1: Types of risk 
 Sudden shocks Slow shifts 
Internal • Infrastructure failure 
• Epidemic 
• Human-made disaster (e.g., 
industrial pollution event, train crash) 
• Closure of a large employer 
• Civil unrest (e.g., intergroup violence, 
rioting) 
• Rising poverty and socio-economic 
polarization, declining social mobility  
• Increasing traffic congestion 
• Ageing infrastructure and building 
stock 
• Urbanization of rural land 
External • Natural disaster (e.g., earthquake) 
• Extreme weather event (e.g., 
hurricane) 
• Economic recession 
• Liquidity crisis 
• National politics and policy (e.g., 
sudden changes in monetary policy, 
interest rates, tax rates, fiscal 
choices, immigration policy) 
• International politics and policy 
(e.g., trade war, military action, 
terrorist attack) 
• Currency appreciation/devaluation 
• Rapid change in energy prices 
• Transformative technological 
innovation 
• Macrodemographic change (e.g., 
ageing society, declining household 
size) 
• Changing societal norms and values 
• Changing volume and sources of 
domestic and international migration  
• Climate change (e.g., rising sea levels, 
rising temperatures, drought) 
• Invasive species 
• Macroeconomic restructuring 
(e.g., deindustrialization, shift to 
service economy) 
• Resource scarcity or depletion (e.g., 
fossil fuels, industrial commodity 
inputs) 
• Accumulation of pollutants in air, 
water, land, plants, and animals 
 
Identifying risks is a necessary precursor to mitigating them, however this occurs in 
an environment of temporal uncertainty. The future is to some extent unknowable. The more 
distant the time horizon, the greater the uncertainty. Still, the cumulative nature or 
potential “long tails” of decisions must be taken into account. Reflecting on his prior work 
on the Greater Toronto Airport Authority’s long-term plan for Pearson Airport, workshop 
participant Toby Lennox put it this way: “We didn’t know what would happen in 50 or 
100 years. The one thing we did know is that if we didn’t get the first 20 years right, the 
next 20 years wouldn’t really matter, because we’d be playing catch up anyway.”  
Determinants of resilience 
A review of recent academic and professional literature in economic geography, disaster 
preparedness and recovery, international development, and urban and regional planning 
shows that an urban region’s resilience is a product of its social, governmental, economic, 
and physical characteristics. Consider the archetype of the sudden shock: the natural 
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disaster. Rapid recovery requires an honest and competent public administration that can 
maintain social order and allocate resources in times of crisis. Mitigation prior to the event 
is equally important: the planning and construction of built environments and 
infrastructure systems that minimize damage. Recovery is also aided by social cohesion: 
networks and institutions outside of government that facilitate cooperation among 
strangers. Campanella and Godschalk (2012), for example, compare two large-scale power 
outages that occurred in New York City. In the 1965 blackout, which occurred in a time 
of economic growth and optimism, “strangers aided one other in the streets and the city 
was enveloped by a sense of collective goodwill and common purpose” (218). Twelve years 
later, in a time of economic decline and social conflict, a second citywide blackout sparked 
widespread looting and other lawlessness. Social cohesion, supported by prosperity, 
mattered.   
 Table 2 lists commonly cited characteristics of socially, economically, and 
environmentally resilient urban regions. As in the New York City example, these 
characteristics are viewed as complementary. Cities with strong social capital; stable, 
efficient, and honest public administration; a diversified economy; flexible labour markets; 
and well-maintained infrastructure perform better in times of economic recession. Cities 
with robust land-use and infrastructure planning and efficient public administration are 
better prepared for, and respond more effectively to, natural disasters. 
Many of these characteristics can be viewed as products of two factors: redundancy 
and diversity. Redundancy is the notion that systems configured as networks are better able 
to function under stress than those configured as hierarchies or chains. If one part of a 
network fails, the load can be transferred to another part; if the weakest link in a chain 
breaks, the failure is complete.  
 Diversity is also important. Drawing on his expertise in electricity production and 
transmission networks, workshop participant Andrew Pietrewicz remarked that redundancy 
without diversity accomplishes little, because duplicates of the same system component 
will fail when subjected to the same stress: “Redundancy is a pillar of resilience,” he said. 
“But it is only sensible when it is linked to diversity as well. There has to be a diversity of 
options. Otherwise the one feature is simply twice as vulnerable.” For this reason, energy 
planners seek to diversify energy sources to ensure consistent supply while creating 
multiple redundant transmission lines to ensure that delivery can continue even if some 
fail.  
While this logic is often applied to physical distribution systems for networked 
goods such as natural gas, water and sewer, wired and wireless communication, and 
mobility systems, it also applies to administrative and decision-making structures. Resilient 
public- and private-sector organizations are capable of efficiently foreseeing and making 
sense of challenges and allocating resources to mitigate them (Sutcliffe and Christianson 
2011). Without redundant and diverse capacities for decision-making, communication, and 
implementation, institutions may be reactive rather than proactive and fail to learn from 
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experience. Worse, they may be ineffective or even collapse in times of crisis (Sutcliffe and 
Vogus 2003). In the workshop discussion, Aderonke Akande spoke about recent work 
through the City of Toronto’s Tower Renewal program that aims to formalize some of the 
structures of support that have emerged organically in some tower communities. During 
the ice storm in the winter of 2014–2015, some communities experienced long power 
outages. Building managers and tower residents set up stations with generators, provided 
food, and checked on people who were isolated in their units while the elevators were 
down. The City is drawing lessons from this community-level organizing to ensure that 
the resilience those communities demonstrated during a time of crisis can be shared with 
others, and built upon to minimize future risks and enhance people’s quality of life. 
 
Table 2: Commonly cited characteristics of resilient cities 
Social 
Governmental/ 
Fiscal Economic 
Physical/ 
Environmental 
• Social cohesion / 
social capital 
• Social mobility / 
relative income 
equality 
• Access to 
affordable housing 
• Access to 
education 
• Access to social 
supports and 
health care 
• Political stability 
• Rule of law  
• Honest 
government 
• Efficient public 
administration 
• Redundant 
communication 
and emergency 
response 
capacities 
• Awareness of risks, 
assets, and 
vulnerabilities 
• Integrated decision 
making processes 
• Fiscal capacity 
• Flexibility (capacity 
to dynamically 
reallocate 
resources) 
• Broad public 
participation 
• Locational 
advantage (factor 
endowments, 
proximity to 
markets) 
• Agglomeration 
economies (city 
size) 
• Diverse economic 
base 
• Skilled and 
productive labour 
force 
• Well-maintained 
infrastructure 
• Low energy costs 
• Low transportation 
congestion costs 
• Advantageous 
location 
• Proximity to 
markets  
• Access to potable 
water 
• Food security 
• Robust long-term 
land-use planning 
• Adaptable land-use 
patterns 
 
Redundancy and diversity are a hard sell in today’s political environment in which 
public-sector efficiency is identified with the elimination of overlap and duplication and 
the construction of “lean” processes and organizations. An alternative way of thinking 
about redundancy and diversity is to shift the focus from costs to returns on investment. To 
do so, we can borrow a concept from the financial world: the portfolio as a risk management 
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tool. Investment portfolios are designed to minimize risk to future returns by diversifying 
the financial instruments they contain. For example, much like a mutual fund, an 
infrastructure network such as an electricity grid or transportation network can be thought 
of as a portfolio of assets that is resilient to stress by virtue of its internal diversity and 
redundancy. 
  
Can resilience be measured? 
Several think tanks and consultancies have developed or are developing quantitative indices of 
resilience with the goal of comparing cities. The Rockefeller Foundation in partnership with Arup 
International Development has developed a City Resilience Index that measures cities’ capacities to 
respond to stresses and challenges (Arup 2014b, 2015). Similarly, London-based real estate firm 
Grosvenor has published indices of city vulnerability and adaptive capacity that combine to form a 
city resilience index score (Grosvenor 2014). The MacArthur Foundation and the Brookings 
Institution supported the Building Resilient Regions project at the University of California at 
Berkeley, which developed a Regional Capacity Index for all 361 American Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MacArthur Foundation n.d.; Weir et al. 2012). In each case, a composite index score is 
calculated from a range of variables, some of which are derived from publicly available statistics, 
and others from subjective assessments.  
A related endeavour is the assessment by insurance companies of external risks to city-regional 
economic output (Reguly 2013; Sundermann, Schelske, and Hausmann 2013). Lloyd’s City Risk 
Index, which is based on analytic techniques developed at Cambridge University, calculates the 
potential value of GDP that would be lost in 301 cities between 2015 and 2025 due to 18 human-
caused and natural threats, including draught, extreme weather event, pandemic, cyber-attack, 
earthquake, and nuclear accident (Lloyd's 2015).  
Toronto and other Canadian cities score relatively well on these indices. Toronto and Vancouver 
score first and second, respectively, in the Grosvenor city resilience index, which included 50 cities. 
Due to its anemic recovery from the Great Recession, Toronto scored only 117th of 300 in Brookings’ 
2009–14 Global Metro Monitor—better than Vancouver (132nd) and Montreal (184th), and about the 
same as Calgary (115th). Lloyd’s estimates that $16 billion, or 6%, of Toronto’s GDP is at risk to 
disaster—similar to Boston and Atlanta, but considerably less than New York or London. According 
to their model, market crash, cyber-attack, and pandemic are the three largest risks Toronto faces. 
While these benchmarks may reveal variation over time and between cities, we suggest that the 
greater promise of the resilience concept is to inform anticipatory policymaking. 
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Anticipatory governance 
Adopting a portfolio approach challenges policymakers and planners to rethink established 
processes and practices. Traditionally, our approach has been to “predict and plan”: to 
identify a preferred outcome or end-state and allocate resources to make it happen.5 As 
Ahern (2011: 341) puts it, conventional planning has “tended toward a static conception—
where sustainability was envisioned as a durable, stable, sometimes formulaic ‘fail-safe’ 
urban form or condition that—once achieved—could persist for generations.”  
One danger of working toward a singular future outcome is the failure to 
anticipate unforeseen risks that may derail it (Hall 1980). Consider the example of Sydney, 
Australia, which in the 1960s prepared a plan that allocated future population and physical 
urban development under prevailing assumptions about average household size. Within a 
decade, average household size had dramatically declined due to broad societal changes, 
including the feminization of the workforce, availability of birth control, longer lifespans, 
and so on. The result: while the population forecast proved accurate, mature suburban areas 
were occupied at 80% of initial planned densities, with obvious implications for service 
demand (Meyer 2003). Another case of faulty assumptions generating long-term 
unintended consequences is that of Minneapolis–St. Paul, Minnesota, whose regional 
planning agency in 1964 forecast a population of four million by 2000—1.3 million more 
than what actually occurred (TCMPC 1964). The Twin Cities pursued highway system 
expansion on this basis during the late 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the region’s 
transportation infrastructure was oversized, consuming fiscal resources that might have 
been allocated to other needs. By the time authorities in New South Wales and Minnesota 
became aware of the gap between their forecasts and reality, considerable public and 
private resources were committed and it was too late to redirect them.  
An alternative approach to “predict and plan” is anticipatory governance or foresight 
(Boyd et al. 2015; Quay 2010). Rather than identifying and working in a linear fashion 
toward a predetermined end-state, anticipatory governance entails evaluating policies and 
investments in terms of their compatibility with the widest range of potential futures. An 
increasingly popular technique for assessing future risks and uncertainty is exploratory 
scenario planning (Quay 2010; Roberts 2014; Tewdwr-Jones and Goddard 2014; Wihbey 
2016). Instead of envisioning the most desirable outcome, projecting forward on the basis 
of current trends, or forecasting the most probable scenario, exploratory scenario planning 
entails the construction of worst-case, unacceptable, and acceptable scenarios. New York 
City’s Panel on Climate Change, for example, devised multiple evidence-based scenarios 
premised on different levels and rates of change in air temperature, annual precipitation, sea 
                                            
5 Indeed, the foundations of the 2006 Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe are the visioning 
by the 2002–03 Central Ontario Zone Smart Growth Panel and the population, housing, and employment 
forecasts in the 2005 Growth Outlook prepared by Hemson Consulting. Similar processes of spatially 
allocating forecast growth in line with a normative vision underlie regional plans in Vancouver, Calgary, and 
almost every other growing city. 
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level, and extreme hot and cold weather and precipitation events. These were then used to 
“stress test” social and infrastructure systems. Those that performed the least well under 
multiple scenarios are prioritized for investment. This logic could be taken further by 
incorporating change in other variables, including labour market participation, energy 
costs, housing costs, and so on. Similarly, the Great Lakes Futures Project employed 
scenario analysis to assess the long-term impacts of eight social, economic, and 
environmental drivers on the basin (Creed et al. 2016; Creed et al. 2015). 
Accommodating uncertainty means devising policy frameworks, institutions, 
physical environments, and infrastructure systems that can adapt, or continue to function, 
under a range of possible future conditions. For example, we might ask whether Ontario 
municipalities are facilitating the creation of new neighbourhoods, subdivisions, and 
settlement areas whose urban form and supporting infrastructure will perform well for 
their residents if energy costs dramatically increase, extreme weather events become more 
frequent, the economic base changes, or the population’s demographic profile shifts. In the 
workshop discussions, participants expressed concern that building adaptability and 
flexibility into policy would translate into more frequent policy changes, undermining 
investment certainty and driving up development costs. Policies and plans are quite 
sensibly subject to mandatory periodic reviews that provide opportunities to reassess policy 
objectives and instruments. Still, those with long-term financial investments in urban 
development have a strong interest in reducing their exposure to risk and uncertainty, 
including changes to the “rules of the game.” The approach to long-term urban planning 
and policymaking presented here is expected to increase, rather than decrease, policy 
stability by “pricing in” long-term risks and sources of uncertainty. A policy framework 
that accommodates a range of possible futures will require less amendment over time 
because it is designed to adapt to changing conditions.  
Finally, policymaking through a resilience lens requires that planners recognize that 
complex interdependencies are a source of uncertainty and that addressing them may have 
unanticipated consequences or perverse impacts. Workshop participant Tom Smith advised 
that policymakers and planners should adopt Hippocrates’ dictum to “do no harm.” 
Summary 
Resilience is a popular buzzword in urban planning and policymaking, particularly in the 
fields of emergency management and climate change. Its meaning, however, is vague. We 
define resilience not as a desirable end-state, but as a governing strategy for risk management 
under considerable uncertainty. We distinguish between two types of risks: sudden shocks, 
including extreme weather events or economic recession, and slow shifts such as 
demographic change. These may be viewed as internal and external to the urban region. 
Local authorities are likely to have more influence on internal sources of risk. Much as in 
investment finance, the urban region should be viewed as portfolio of assets whose collective 
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redundancy and diversity contribute to its resilience. The goal of resilience-oriented 
policymaking should be to foster these characteristics at a variety of scales and across 
domains. The process of resilience-oriented policymaking is anticipatory governance: the use 
of exploratory scenario analysis to determine which policy interventions will produce an 
urban environment that will perform well under the maximum range of potential future 
conditions. This is distinct from conventional “predict and plan” approaches, which identify 
a singular desired future outcome and work toward creating it.  
  
Whose resilience? Resilience for whom? 
The concept of resilience has been criticized on several grounds. Social theorists have noted that a 
basic condition of modern life is a “risk society,” one that simultaneously embraces and resists the 
risks associated with rapid change (Beck 1992; Giddens 2002). In this context, some see the 
emergence of resilience discourse as related to the contemporary atmosphere of heightened global 
economic, social, and political turbulence and environmental threats, as well as a political-
ideological context favourable to limited government, devolution of authority, and individual and 
community self-reliance (Amin 2013; Beilin and Wilkinson 2015; Fainstein 2015; Shaw and 
Maythorne 2011; Welsh). In connection with the latter, there may be a political tendency to use 
resilience (in the sense of “bouncing back”) to defend a suboptimal or unjust status quo. Framing 
urban resilience as a product of social capital or the strength of social bonds may also serve as a 
cover for governments to “de-socialize” risks by privatizing or transferring welfare-state functions 
to individuals or households. Moreover, Jabareen (2015) notes that control over the identification 
and prioritization of risks, as well as the allocation of resources in response to them, is itself a 
source of power. For this reason, most emphasize inclusive and collaborative urban governance 
processes (Goldstein 2012).  
Recognizing these criticisms, we propose that resilience is a potentially useful guide to 
policymaking insofar as it foregrounds underappreciated sources of uncertainty and the complex 
interconnections among social, economic, environmental, and fiscal variables. 
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2. The Toronto region: risks, vulnerabilities, and actions 
Mounting an anticipatory governance process for the Toronto region is beyond the scope 
of this project. We saw an opportunity, however, to contribute to public debate on the 
health and future of the region and, more specifically, to the Ontario government’s 
coordinated review of its Toronto-region land-use planning policies by conducting a 
holistic assessment of assets and vulnerabilities in relation to known risks. Toronto is 
correctly hailed as a high-performing region, yet over the past two decades local 
foundations, academic researchers, and others have independently catalogued a range of 
negative indicators and trends.  
This section synthesizes some these disparate findings with discussions that 
emerged in four workshops held in February 2015 with financial support from the 
Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Each workshop focused on a theme: the economy, 
society, the built and natural environments, and fiscal health. Twenty-eight professionals 
with experience in a broad range of issues were invited to participate (see Appendix). 
Many of the participants came from outside the traditional constituencies of land-use 
planning. In addition to planners, architects and urban designers, developer-builders, and 
environmentalists, the roster of participants also included practitioners and experts in 
social-service delivery, geriatric care, economic development, housing market and 
demographic forecasting, fiscal policy, and the design and finance of infrastructure projects. 
Workshop participants represented themselves, not their organizations or employers, and 
their remarks presented in this paper are their own.  
Each was asked to consider three questions:  
 
1. What risks, threats, and uncertainties do the Toronto region face over the medium 
and long terms?  
2. What are the region’s principal assets and vulnerabilities that may improve or 
undermine its capacity to anticipate and respond to these challenges?  
3. And what interventions are required to improve this capacity? 
 
Taken together, the workshops elicited a wide range of often provocative opinions 
and arguments. They also revealed interesting, and sometimes surprising, connections and 
points of consensus. At the same time, the discussion illustrated what one anthropologist 
has called the Rashomon Effect, after the Japanese film in which different characters 
interpret the same events in different ways (Heider 1988). The housing developer, the 
economist, the social worker, the medical doctor, the environmentalist, and the public 
finance expert are all centrally concerned with urban development and its impacts, yet 
each understands it in different terms.  
 Much has occurred since the workshops were held. Most obviously, the 2015 
federal election revealed a public appetite for broad-based infrastructure investment that 
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was not foreseen by workshop participants. Debates over the causes of and solutions to 
metropolitan housing affordability crises have intensified. And in the aftermath of the Paris 
Conference on Climate Change, federal-provincial relations now revolve around the 
linkage between climate change mitigation strategies and the future of Canada’s natural 
resource economy. We acknowledge these and other changes and events in the discussion.  
Assets 
Toronto’s social sustainability and economic growth stem from a range of natural and 
human-made assets. As Juan Gomez put it, “in this region we … have the right 
fundamentals: education, transportation, infrastructure, openness to business, and the ability 
to expand and attract workers who can find housing.” 
 
Location, natural endowments, and proximity to markets. Greater Toronto derives stability and 
security from its location and natural endowments. Located near the border with the 
United States means that Toronto is within one day’s drive or a short flight of 
approximately one-third of the North American population. Southern Ontario also 
benefits from being located far inland, yet with uninterrupted access to Atlantic sea routes 
via the St. Lawrence Seaway. This gives Toronto a climate-change advantage—about 13% 
of the world’s urban population lives in low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to rising sea 
levels. The inundation of coastal areas will displace tens of millions of people and disrupt 
economic production and trade (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). The Toronto region also 
benefits from direct access to abundant fresh water, of which the Great Lakes account for 
20% of the world’s supply. Finally, although the growing season is shorter than in the 
American heartland, the food security of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, and Southern 
Ontario more generally, is supported by abundant productive farmland. 
 
Agglomeration, growth, and economic diversity. In the workshop discussion, architect Martin 
Sparrow, whose career has been primarily in Alberta, favourably compared Toronto’s 
economic diversity to Calgary’s oil-driven boom-bust cycle. The Toronto region emerged 
in the early postwar period as Canada’s preeminent manufacturing and service-sector hub, 
supported by consistent investment in comprehensive infrastructure systems, including 
highway, bus, and subway networks, and lake-based water and sewer systems, as well as 
integrated industrial and business parks planning. This facilitated economic 
diversification—while the region has large automotive, pharmaceutical, and financial 
services sectors, it is not dependent on any one of them. By virtue of its sectoral diversity, 
Toronto evaded the postwar economic decline of the nearby “rustbelt” cities of the Upper 
Midwest and Northeastern states (King, Hracs, and Denstedt 2010: 1–4).  
  The Toronto region’s greatest assets may be its size and consistent growth. The 
population of the Greater Golden Horseshoe has increased by an average of one million 
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residents in each decade since 1950. The provincial government forecasts that this will 
continue, fuelled almost entirely by international immigration. By 2040, the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe is expected to have a population of 13.4 million, up from 7.8 million in 
2000. About three-quarters of this growth is forecast to occur in the Greater Toronto and 
Hamilton Area (GTHA). This translates into national “heft.” The Greater Toronto Area 
(not including the outer ring of the Greater Golden Horseshoe) accounts for 20% of 
Canada’s GDP, and 45% of Ontario’s.  
  Population increase is an asset in and of itself because it grows the economic and 
fiscal pie: new residents are also new workers and taxpayers. Economists have shown that 
economic growth correlates with both sectoral diversity and the agglomeration of 
population and businesses—in essence, that growth begets growth (see Glaeser 2010; 
Krugman 1991; Wolfe 2014). As Matthias Sweet noted, “The single biggest asset that the 
Toronto Region has is a large labour pool. And this large labour pool gives us this capacity 
for people to find their optimal jobs and for employers to find their optimal labour.” In 
short, Toronto’s agglomeration enables it to be diverse and specialized at the same time—
the very definition of a redundant and diverse portfolio of economic assets.  
 
Political stability, tolerance, and diversity. Toronto’s growth has been sustained by its relative 
stability. Canada is recognized as possessing exceptional political stability and low crime 
rates even compared to other developed countries. (Indeed, Canadian cities’ high rankings 
in the Grosvenor Resilience Index and other business climate and quality-of-life indices 
stem in large part from domestic political stability, lack of corruption, and rule of law.)  
Toronto’s stability and tolerance make it attractive to migrants and international 
investors. In fact, diverse international migration has driven the region’s economic 
agglomeration and diversification. A societal consensus in favour of large-scale immigration 
sets Canada apart from most other democratic countries. Indeed, Canada may be the only 
immigrant-receiving country without a mainstream anti-immigration political party. While 
accepting approximately 100,000 international migrants per year and becoming one of the 
most ethno-linguistically diverse cities in the world, the Toronto region has experienced 
little of the large-scale social and political conflict or civil unrest seen in other cities. 
Evidence is accumulating that Canadian urban housing markets—principally Vancouver’s 
but also Toronto’s—have become safe places for international investors to park capital at a 
time when returns are low and a weak Canadian dollar reduces costs to external buyers 
(Canada 2016; Duggan 2016; Ireland 2015).Toronto’s historical capacity to receive and 
integrate international migrants is facilitated by its existing diasporic communities. As Peter 
Thoma put it, “people looking for where to go in the world will start with their own 
personal networks, and those networks exist in Toronto.”  
Some workshop participants proposed that Toronto may benefit from problems 
elsewhere in the world, including population displacement due to war, inter-group 
conflict, natural disaster, climate change, and economic and political uncertainty. Indeed, 
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the World Bank (2016) has made several dire forecasts: that water scarcity alone may 
reduce GDP in Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia by as much as 14% by 2050; rising 
prices for food and clean water will blunt global poverty reduction; and draught and 
natural disaster will spark resource-driven armed conflicts. Toby Lennox argued that 
Toronto should market its stability to global corporations who may be looking to shift 
production and supply chains to locations less susceptible to long-term risks, including 
political instability and climate change. 
 
Relative prudence in a favourable fiscal environment. Collectively, Canadian governments have 
considerably more spending and borrowing capacity than they did 20 years ago, the latter 
enhanced by historically low interest rates. Total government spending nationwide 
decreased to 39% of GDP in 2014 from 53% in 1992. The total government debt-to-GDP 
ratio (again, all levels) declined from over 100% to about 66% in 2007 as the federal and 
many provincial governments brought their budgets into balance in the late 1990s and 
2000s through a mix of expenditure reductions and tax increases (Crowley, Murphy, and 
Veldhuis 2012). Nationally, stimulus measures drove the total government debt-to-GDP 
ratio up to 86% in 2014. Despite this uptick, the debt burden is considerably less than in 
similar economies. Overall, the municipal fiscal balance sheet is healthy. Municipal 
governments are forbidden to run operating deficits, and collectively have plenty of room 
to borrow for capital projects (Bazel and Mintz 2014). The City of Toronto has voluntarily 
elected to cap its debt servicing costs well below the province’s limit of one-quarter of the 
operating budget. Canadian governments’ fiscal prudence relative to many other countries 
means that resources are available to pursue resilience-enhancing social, economic, and 
environmental policy objectives. 
External risks 
Macro-demographic risk: The ageing society. Last year was the first in which the total number 
of Canadian seniors exceeded people under the age of 15. The long-term decline in birth 
rates coupled with longer lifespans means that the average age of the population is 
increasing while labour market participation rates are declining (Ontario 2014: ch. 1). The 
Ontario government forecasts that, province-wide, the number of seniors will double in 
absolute terms by 2035. This will have a variety of interdependent effects. 
  A growing over-65 population will spur greater demand for senior-appropriate 
housing and neighbourhood environments. In the United States, seniors have eclipsed 
young people as the principal driver of household formation (Kolko 2015). With 
advancing age comes reduced mobility and increased incidence of disease and disability, all 
of which undermine the confidence and capacity to live independently (Frye 2014; WHO 
2007). Neighbourhood-scale barriers to mobility, such as wheelchair-inaccessible 
pedestrian environments and buildings, pose a profound barrier to independent ageing in 
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place. Legislated requirements, including under the 2005 Accessibility for Ontarians with 
Disabilities Act, pertain to new construction, but the retrofitting of existing neighbourhoods 
is often impracticable. 
  The social isolation of older people will only grow in the coming decades. Samir 
Sinha noted that “we’re less likely now than 50 years ago to live in intergenerational 
households or even intergenerational communities. In fact, 23% of older Ontarians tell us 
that they don’t have anyone close by who can help them with a simple task if needed. That 
level of social isolation is a big concern.” As people continue to age in place in 
neighbourhoods that are single-use and car-dependent, the risks associated with social 
isolation will grow, including increased emergency response needs and health care costs. 
  A higher dependency ratio (the proportion of young and elderly dependents to 
income-earners) will put pressure on the tax base. More people on fixed incomes, a 
substantial proportion of which will be in the form of transfers from governments, 
translates into higher spending demands and less tax revenue. At the same time, the 
growing cohort of seniors will generate new demands for health and long-term care 
expenditures. Governments will also be expected to pay out pension and other benefits to 
a growing number of former employees. Demographically driven revenue constraints and 
cost pressures will occur in addition to demands for new spending on growth-related 
infrastructure and the maintenance and replacement of existing systems. In Greater 
Toronto, the trend toward an ageing society will be somewhat moderated by immigration, 
which brings working-age people and youth into the economy.  
 
Environmental risk: Climate change. Changes to weather and air and water temperatures pose 
another category of risk. The increasing frequency of sudden shocks such as extreme 
weather events, as well as slow shifts such as increasing seasonal temperature variation, will 
impose direct and indirect costs on households and businesses, especially in cities (Hunt 
and Watkiss 2011). Floods as a result of high-volume precipitation will stress storm water 
management infrastructure and increase soil erosion, resulting in increased property 
damage. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that $US4.2 trillion of economic value 
would be at risk globally through the year 2100, should the average temperature rise by 
4ºC (EIU 2015). Climate-change risks may be anticipated and mitigated, although their 
precise timing and severity of impact may not be predictable. Insurance companies are 
already pricing climate change risks into their models (Sundermann, Schelske, and 
Hausmann 2014; Team Green Analytics 2015).  
 By the 2040s, the average temperature in the Toronto region is expected to rise by 
3.5 to 4ºC, increasing with distance from Lake Ontario (Theobald et al. 2011). The 
University of Hawaii’s Mora Lab projects that in the absence of global mitigation of 
carbon emissions, Toronto will reach “climate departure”—the year after which the 
average temperature will exceed the extreme high between 1860 and 2005—in 2047 
(Mora 2013). The Toronto Environmental Office and Toronto Public Health forecast that 
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the number of days with extreme heat (over 30ºC) will triple and that the number of 
annual heat-related deaths could double by mid-century (City of Toronto 2014b). Analysis 
indicates that air temperatures are highest in high-density areas featuring more 
impermeable surfaces, which indicates the need to integrate heat mitigation into new and 
redeveloped built environments (Rinner and Hussain 2011). As temperatures rise, a greater 
proportion of precipitation will fall as rain rather than snow. There is likely to be 
considerably less snow in the winter, but precipitation will also be more concentrated, 
falling in short, high-volume bursts that will challenge existing stormwater infrastructure 
and run off rather than be absorbed into soil (Theobald et al. 2011).  
  Globally, fresh water is under stress due to climate change and urban development 
(UN Water 2014). The Great Lakes will not be immune to climate change effects. While 
cities on the ocean coasts experience sea-level rise, scientists forecast that in the Great 
Lakes, rising air and water temperatures will decrease water levels through evaporation, as 
well as lead to larger and more frequent algae blooms that undermine fish habitats and, 
potentially, water supplies (Gronewold et al. 2013; O'Reilly et al. 2015). Climate change 
will also affect the generation, distribution, and demand for energy. One analysis suggests 
that lower water levels could reduce Ontario’s hydroelectric output by 1,100 MW, at the 
same time that demand for cooling systems will increase (Clean Air Partnership 2011). 
Heat also reduces the efficiency of long-distance electricity transmission and distribution 
systems (Aivalioti 2015).  
  All in all, the localized impact of weather and temperature change on ground- and 
lakewater supply for urban and agricultural uses, invasive species, ecosystem function, 
energy supply, and lake-based shipping is uncertain (Gregg et al. 2012). The research 
suggests that the built environment and infrastructure systems lack the redundancy and 
diversity to absorb climate change effects. 
 
Economic risk: Flagging innovation and investment attraction. Standing in the background are 
perennial sources of uncertainty: macroeconomic cycles, transformative technological 
innovations such as automation, change in the terms of trade, energy costs, volatile 
currency exchange rates, and fluctuations in access to capital. By virtue of strong linkages 
to continental and world markets, the local and national economies are not islands. 
Participants in the economy-themed workshop agreed that local residents, firms, and 
governments have always been, and always will be, to some degree subject to decisions, 
flows, and forces that are beyond their control.  
  Frank Clayton raised the spectre of the American Rustbelt to say that even long-
term success can come to an end. After dominating global steel and automobile production 
for generations, the fortunes of many American cities quickly reversed when offshore 
producers produced more innovative products and undercut them on cost. The collapse of 
Nortel, which had a large footprint in the Toronto region, and the radical decline of 
Blackberry, are examples of champions being out-innovated and out-competed. Canadian 
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exporters know that the exchange rate drives their competitiveness. Canadian goods and 
services producers came to depend on a weak dollar in the mid-1980s and again in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. When the exchange rate rapidly returned to par in 2011–12 for the 
first time since the mid-1970s, many businesses were virtually wiped out, especially in the 
manufacturing sector (Oschinski, Chan, and Kobrinsky 2014; Spiro 2013).  
Ontario is a magnet for foreign direct investment by market share and dollar 
volume, topping California and Texas as the largest North American receiving jurisdiction 
for greenfield projects (FDI Intelligence 2015: 10). While the Conference Board (2012) 
and others view foreign direct investment as a driver of innovation, productivity, and 
income growth, FDI also renders local economies vulnerable to decisions by foreign firms 
whose material interests may lie elsewhere. There is however an unfortunate history of the 
Ontario and Canadian governments giving foreign branch plants loans and concessions in 
exchange for production and employment guarantees, only to have those firms use the 
threat of closure to bargain for more incentives once the agreements expire. Cluster-based 
economic development strategies may embed mobile capital in the local economy. One 
participant brought up the case of California-based semiconductor maker AMD, which 
acquired local graphics processor firm ATI Technologies in 2006. AMD has maintained the 
Canadian operation because of strong local linkages.  
While southern Ontario has benefited from proximity to and integration with the 
American market in the past, it remains subject to external pressures and sources of 
uncertainty. The challenge is to ensure the resilience of the regional economy by fostering 
sectoral diversity and redundant capacities (Wolfe 2010). This points to nurturing a diverse 
portfolio of clusters that embed talent and investment as opposed to inducing standalone 
investments with subsidies that may be outbid by other jurisdictions. It also points to the 
need for investment in hard and soft infrastructures that support skills development and 
innovation, improve businesses’ access to capital, and lower the cost of mobility of people 
and goods.  
Internal vulnerabilities 
Complacency. In The Resilience Dividend, Rodin (281) concludes that there is less urgency to 
act in stable times, so governments tend to reactively respond to crises instead of 
proactively anticipating the future. The governance challenge is therefore to “reduce 
reliance on crisis as a driver of policy change” (300). Matthias Sweet agreed that slow-burn 
problems often lose out to crises: “if a problem needs to be loud for it to be worth 
addressing, that’s problematic because some problems are going to be sexier and some are 
not.”  
  Participants in the fiscal- and economy-themed workshops agreed that decades of 
steady growth and abundant natural assets and locational advantages have bred 
complacency regarding the region’s social and economic problems. Richard Joy stated that 
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the Toronto region’s relative economic stability during the Great Recession and its legacy 
assets have “in some ways masked a lot of our larger challenges and allowed us to not face 
them.” Complacency also stems from the relative absence of crisis. Many of the region’s 
vulnerabilities have emerged gradually and many of the risks it faces are long-term and 
cumulative. It is easier to be complacent about slow shifts than sudden shocks.  
 
Inadequate strategic regional coordination. One outcome of complacency is inadequate 
regional coordination. Several workshop participants decried the region’s disjointed local 
governance, seeing in today’s panoply of municipalities a situation analogous to that which 
existed before the creation of Metro Toronto in 1954. At that time, what is now the City 
of Toronto contained 13 municipalities within what was then York County; today, the 
GTAH contains 25 municipalities and the Greater Golden Horseshoe 110. Metro was 
created to centralize capital borrowing to modernize infrastructure, influence the urban 
development pattern through infrastructure provision and subdivision control, operate a 
regional transit system (the TTC), and manage regional roads. It was enormously successful 
in the 1950s and 1960s (although allowed to wither in the 1970s) because it could borrow 
at lower interest rates than its constituent municipalities and directly link infrastructure 
provision to regulatory land-use planning. Frank Clayton believes a new regional 
government is necessary to coordinate economic, land, and infrastructural development at 
a broad scale: “My view is to take the census metropolitan area [and] create a [two-tier] 
government like we used to have in Metropolitan Toronto, with each of the regions and 
the City of Toronto becoming the lower tier. At least then you’d be doing the planning 
and financing, everything, on the economic regional basis. And if you don’t have that, 
you’re in trouble.”  
  The creation of a two-tier regional government has not been seriously proposed 
since the Golden task force (GTA Task Force 1996), and local government restructuring 
has been politically toxic since the provincially imposed amalgamations of the late 1990s 
and 2000s. Instead, the province has become the de facto regional government. Earlier 
provincial plans to which municipal plans must conform—the Niagara Escarpment 
(Ontario 1985) and Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plans (Ontario 2002)—have been 
supplemented by the Greenbelt Plan (Ontario 2005) and the Growth Plan for the Greater 
Golden Horseshoe (Ontario 2006). The province also created Metrolinx, a new regional 
agency to plan, coordinate, and partially operate transit systems.  
  The emergence of a durable regional perspective and voice has been stifled, 
however, by the absence of a regional representative institution through which local leaders 
can manage intermunicipal conflict and define and solve collective problems. Symptomatic 
of the lack of a regional perspective is the province’s recent abolition, under suburban 
pressure, of “GTA pooling,” through which municipalities in the surrounding regions 
transferred funds to the City of Toronto to operate social programs. Several workshop 
participants also argued that intermunicipal competition for investment produces perverse 
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outcomes. While some employment zones are deserving of preservation, the absence of a 
coordinated regional employment land strategy means that municipal economic 
development planning is driven more by the aspirational chase for a lucrative non-
residential property tax base than marketplace reality (Blais 2015: 60). Peter Thoma 
suggested that for municipalities,  
preserving employment land has become an end in itself. … [Municipalities] all 
have teams of economic development practitioners who are trying to sell their 
specific community to investment interests. I understand the competitive 
dimension that exists between neighbouring municipalities within the region. But 
when you actually look at where the jobs are going and the types of jobs and 
environments that young people aspire to work in, they’re not the kinds of jobs 
that are on the lands that policymakers are so adamant to protect through land-use 
controls. 
It remains to be seen whether investment attraction strategy will become more 
regionalized with the impending consolidation of the Greater Toronto Marketing Alliance 
and Invest Toronto (a City of Toronto agency). Similarly, it is unclear whether Metrolinx 
will evolve beyond being a planner and operator of regional bus and rail lines to become a 
more robust coordinator of local transit systems. For example, will the fare system be 
regionalized, as in Montréal and Vancouver’s multi-zone systems, or will crossing municipal 
boundaries continue to entail paying double fares? Certainly the region-wide adoption of 
the Presto digital fare card would enable moving to the zone-based collection and sharing 
of revenues across multiple providers. 
  At several points in the workshop discussion, participants expressed concern that 
the logic of electoral competition, as well as political friction between provincial and local 
governments, have inhibited evidence-based regional planning and the pooling of 
municipal resources to pursue capital projects and operate services of regional scope and 
significance. Effective planning and coordination of social, economic, and environmental 
governance in Greater Toronto hinges on the provincial government actively maintaining 
its role as the keystone of the regional governance system. Remove the provincial keystone 
and the system risks tumbling down.  
 
A “missed generation” of infrastructure investment. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of 
complacency is the gradual emergence of the infrastructure deficit. The 1950s–1970s were 
a golden age of growth-related infrastructure expansion in Ontario. Indeed, much of the 
stock of highway, transit, water and sewer, and electricity production and transmission 
infrastructure dates from that period. Since the economic malaise of the 1970s, there has 
been a tug-of-war between the pressing need for growth-related expansion of 
infrastructure systems and the maintenance and replacement of existing ones. Nationally, 
public investment in new and existing infrastructure declined by more than half between 
26 
the late 1950s and the early 2000s as a proportion of GDP (Mackenzie 2013). At the same 
time that the capital stock built during the boom years aged toward the end of its 
operational life, the proportion of public investment spent on maintenance has declined 
since the 1990s (Félio 2012; RCCAO 2010: 14).  
  The result is a local and national infrastructure deficit or, as Tom Smith put, an 
“infrastructure debt, accumulated over a generation.” One recent analysis finds that to 
maximize hard infrastructure systems’ contribution to GDP growth, Canada would have to 
increase total national spending on infrastructure by 62% and almost double the proportion 
going toward maintenance for the foreseeable future. Not doing so would leave 40% of 
real per-capita GDP on the table (RCCAO 2010: 21–23). Richard Joy estimated that if 
transportation, housing, electricity, water and wastewater infrastructure are included, 
Greater Toronto’s capital funding gap may be something on the order of $4 billion per 
year.  
 The infrastructure deficit undermines the region’s economic and environmental 
resilience. Decaying and inadequate infrastructure discourages business investment, 
suppresses economic growth, and imposes significant social costs on residents (see, for 
example, Ragan and Vuong 2015). Lack of investment in a diverse and redundant 
infrastructure portfolio has reduced economic competitiveness and residents’ quality of life, 
while inhibiting proactive mitigation of risks associated with climate change and the 
ageing society. Matti Siemiatycki succinctly summed up the risks associated with a 
widening infrastructure gap: 
I think we’ve clearly missed a generation of infrastructure investment and I think 
that’s a huge risk. And when I say infrastructure, I mean it really broadly: 
transportation is the obvious one that everyone talks about, but public housing and 
a lot of our other infrastructure is decaying. I think we have a problem with both 
finding the money for these things, but also finding the political will. … These 
things are starting to compound. When it comes to productivity: our deficit in 
terms of infrastructure is contributing to that. When we talk about environmental 
sustainability, our deficit in terms of infrastructure is contributing to that, and I 
would also include social equity in there as well.  
  Instead of occurring incrementally, capital investment tends to be “lumpy,” 
happening only when breakdowns provoke crisis or governments engage in 
countercyclical stimulus spending. Hilary Holden and Matti Siemiatycki both argued that 
major public infrastructure investments are sufficiently infrequent, making each 
opportunity feel like the last. In such an environment, politicians scramble, “elbows out,” to 
support local pet projects, leading to ad hoc and often suboptimal outcomes. “We are not 
good at prioritizing regionally or integrating the evaluation of projects into political 
decisions,” said Siemiatycki. Stop-and-go construction is more expensive than incremental 
system expansion. This is because expertise and administrative capacities are dismantled and 
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rebuilt on a project-by-project basis. Building in bursts rather than incrementally also 
drives up the cost of projects’ labour and material inputs. This echoes a recent McKinsey 
Global Institute report, which argued that global infrastructure demand could be met at 
40% less cost if practices were improved: “On the whole, countries continue to invest in 
poorly conceived projects, take a long time to approve them, miss opportunities to 
innovate in how to deliver them, and then don’t make the most of existing assets before 
opting to build expensive new capacity” (MGI 2013: 4).  
 
Self-imposed fiscal incapacity. The perennial question, of course, is where infrastructure 
investment capital should come from. As Toby Lennox colourfully put it, “we are smoking 
something if we think infrastructure is going to come without someone paying for it.” 
Four options are commonly proposed, often in combination: borrowing, raising taxes, 
capturing increases in land value due to infrastructure expansion, and public-private 
partnerships. However, the full use of each has been inhibited by political opposition, 
resulting in self-imposed fiscal incapacity.  
It is sensible to fund durable infrastructure with borrowing because the cost can be 
spread over the lifetime of assets. As noted above, interest rates are low and the 
governments’ balance sheets are in relatively good shape overall. Fiscal capacity is, however, 
unevenly distributed across levels of government. While economists agree that the 
municipal sector as a whole can sustainably assume more debt, some growing 
municipalities, including York Region, have reached provincially imposed borrowing 
limits. Robert Hatton noted that municipalities are increasing their borrowing capacity 
while reducing recurring debt servicing costs by issuing longer-term bonds. While 10-year 
bonds were once the norm, the City of Toronto is now issuing some 30-year bonds—a 
term still shorter than the expected life of the underlying asset. While the size of annual 
payments is reduced, this may result in higher overall servicing costs. Most provinces’ 
borrowing capacity is constrained by substantial and increasing debt loads. Ontario has 
remained in deficit since the Great Recession and, as a result, its net debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased from 26% to 39% between 2008 and 2016 (Ontario 2016). Given the Ontario 
economy’s pace of growth, this ratio will remain elevated for the foreseeable future (FAO 
2015). Given the relatively constrained borrowing capacity of municipal and provincial 
governments, the federal government may have the greatest capacity to engage in deficit 
financing for infrastructure expenditure. The new federal government’s decision to incur 
deficits to fund a greater share of infrastructure represents a move in this direction (see box 
“A more strategic federalism?”). 
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A more strategic federalism? 
Early signs from the new federal government elected in October 2015 suggest that Ottawa’s 
increased spending on infrastructure renewal will be guided by long-term productivity 
enhancement rather than short-term stimulus, and will be sustained over a long period of time. 
Ottawa has also signalled that it will increase its funding from one-third to one-half of project costs, 
an amount more in line with the share of incremental revenue it will receive from productive capital 
investments, and also give provinces more discretion over how money is spent.  
 
One consequence of federal and provincial retrenchment and municipal 
governments’ resistance to incurring capital debt is the common practice of transferring 
financial risk to the private sector. Under so-called front-ending agreements, whereby 
developers agree to finance and install infrastructure systems on their own, the developer 
takes on debt that would otherwise be borrowed by government albeit at higher interest 
rates. These costs are then passed the cost on to the consumer. This has two negative 
effects. First, it drives up rents and prices for residential and employment real estate, with 
negative social and economic impacts. According to Lloyd Cherniak, another consequence 
is a dramatic increase over the past decade in the amount of borrowing risk assumed by 
developers. This has driven up the size of development projects and reduces the number of 
competitive players in the market. Ultimately, it may lead developers to shift investment to 
jurisdictions where they are exposed to less risk. There is anecdotal evidence that some 
large Ontario developers have expanded into other North American housing markets for 
this reason.  
A second option is to increase current revenues. Participants agreed that that 
governments’ general unwillingness in recent years to increase or shift the impact of taxes 
inhibits our collective ability to meet current infrastructure needs, let alone head off future 
crises. They also agreed that new revenues lie with new taxes of broad incidence, thereby 
spreading burdens across the population.6 In the City of Toronto context, Peter Thoma 
lamented that politicians have shied away from taking full advantage of new revenue 
sources conferred by the 2006 City of Toronto Act. (The Municipal Land Transfer Tax is the 
exception, but it exposes the City to potential risk by hitching its fiscal health to the 
continuation of the housing boom.) Similarly, provincial and municipal governments have 
ruled out several potential revenue streams identified by business leaders and expert task 
forces as the most productive, predictable, and equitable ways to fund transit expansion: 
increases to the income tax, the HST, and the gas tax, and also the introduction of road 
tolls. Despite moves to raise the top marginal tax rate at the provincial and federal levels, 
the political conditions of increasing general revenues remain elusive. 
                                            
6 Generally speaking, the incidence of a tax refers to the distribution of its burden across society. Taxes 
of narrow incidence, such as “sin taxes” on cigarettes and alcohol, are borne by a small segment of society, 
while taxes of broad incidence, such as the HST and income tax, are paid by almost everyone. A progressive 
tax skews the burden toward upper-income earners, while a regressive tax’s burden falls on low-income 
households. 
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A third potential source is to capture growth-related land-value uplift through the 
property tax or development charges. Workshop participants disagreed on whether land-
value uplift would be sufficient or appropriate to cover capital costs. Tom Smith 
acknowledged that “there is always a [public] cost of development and most of those are 
fair. And there should be a public benefit from private undertakings.” But, in his opinion, 
“growth can’t pay for what’s needed now. … We have to shift away from relying on 
growth to pay for growth-related infrastructure and the infrastructure deficit.” Similarly, 
Frank Clayton argued that the benefits of new infrastructure are enjoyed not only by new 
residents. Rather, benefits are sufficiently dispersed that everyone has a stake in 
infrastructure expansion. To the extent that it is impossible to disentangle the proportion of 
infrastructure costs that benefit new versus existing residents, the current emphasis on 
development charges may be misplaced.  
Finally, governments may use public-private partnerships (P3s) to access capital 
from private investors, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds to achieve public 
objectives. Ideally, P3s may not only reduce public debt exposure for large up-front 
investments, but also create incentives for efficient and timely project delivery and design 
innovation. Several participants in the fiscal- and economy-themed workshops argued that 
Ontario has lagged behind other jurisdictions in pursuing innovative financing and 
governance techniques, including P3s, the use of project management intermediaries to 
drive innovation, and the use of public corporations empowered to borrow on their own 
account against future revenues. Toby Lennox argued that pension funds are ready to invest 
in large projects, particularly in higher-order transit, but that the size of Canadian deals is 
not large enough and, as a result, there are “large pools of capital going elsewhere.” 
Siemiatycki and Robert Hatton stressed that the public’s dominant image of P3s as a long-
term operating concession over which the public sector has little control, as in the case of 
Highway 407, has undermined the public image of P3s and does not capture the full range 
of possibilities (see box “Perils of P3s”).  
 
Perils of P3s 
While P3s are framed as transferring financial risk to the private sector, poorly designed contracts 
may create costly problems. For example, Siemiatycki argued that inflexible long-term contracts 
may undermine adaptation to changing circumstances. He shared a story of a design-build-finance-
maintain P3 in the UK to build schools, where the government became locked into paying for under-
enrolled facilities that could not be closed or converted to other community uses. Siemiatycki 
argued that maximizing public benefits and asset flexibility while minimizing risk can be achieved 
with shorter contract terms and unbundling design from construction and financing from operating 
costs. Robert Hatton also said that municipalities should be cautious about “signing away your 
revenue stream,” as occurred with Highway 407.  
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The infrastructure deficit has compounded due to the political failure to allocate 
resources toward necessary expansion, maintenance, and replacement projects. This has 
undermined the region’s social, economic, and environmental resilience. Taxation and debt 
remain politically fraught as leaders have failed to make the case for funding public 
investments not only to accommodate and support growth, but also to maintain existing 
systems. 
 
Lack of alignment between resources and policy goals. The provincial government makes 
decisions regarding new major transportation infrastructure while municipalities are 
responsible for land-use regulation. Transit lines are being built with the expectation that 
they will spur the redevelopment of surrounding areas in a manner consistent with broader 
policy objectives, not least ensuring sufficient ridership to justify the investment and the 
creation of “complete” communities that incorporate residential, employment, and amenity 
uses. As Richard Joy and Hilary Holden noted in the workshops, the provincial 
government has not required municipalities to rezone land as a condition of receiving 
funding. As a result, infrastructure investment may not deliver on its transformative 
potential and require higher than expected subsidies.  
Similarly, workshop participants brought up examples in which some agencies’ 
priorities worked against land-use goals. Lloyd Cherniak noted that in his experience as a 
large-scale developer, school board requirements for school yard sizes and one-storey 
school buildings have had the unintended consequence of consuming more land when 
developers were being told to design and build communities more densely. “If you want 
intensification you have to think in terms of public assets as well. Schools are one example; 
but they are the worst.” Similarly, the location of jobs and amenities in low-density, single-
use employment and retail zones separated from residential areas inhibits access by means 
other than the automobile. Dependence on any one mode of transportation undermines 
resilience because the overall mobility system lacks diversity and redundancy.   
 
Lagging economic performance. The region largely evaded the Great Recession, its 
population and employment levels continuing to increase. Still, the economy has by some 
measures been stalled since the early 1990s recession, a quarter-century ago  
(Boston Consulting 1995; Burleton 2002). As Juan Gomez put it, “we’ve plateaued.” The 
value of Ontario’s exports to the United States has declined over the past decade, in large 
part due to the erosion of urban manufacturing (TRBOT 2015). Regionally, 
manufacturing’s proportion of all jobs declined by half since the late 1980s (TWIF 2009), 
and 200,000 manufacturing jobs were lost across the Greater Goldern Horseshoe between 
2001 and 2014 (Blais 2015: 33). The City of Toronto alone lost 117,000 manufacturing 
jobs between 1983 and 2013, many of them during the restructuring that followed the 
adoption of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States (City of Toronto 2014c). 
(For comparison, banking and financial services employment increased by 78,060 over the 
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same period.) At the same time, exporting firms that grew too accustomed to the low 
dollar during the late 1990s suffered when the exchange rate spiked during the western 
commodity boom.  
  Despite a large, diverse, and highly educated labour market, studies point to 
persistently low labour productivity, higher unemployment rates, a weak innovation 
system, and lagging inward foreign direct investment compared to peer cities, producing a 
widening “prosperity gap” (Conference Board 2012, 2015; TRBOT 2014a, 2014b). 
Damian Dupuy voiced concern that the innovation gap may be counting Toronto out of 
rapidly changing high-value-added sectors such as advanced manufacturing: “We have very 
low business investment in innovation. Innovation is really anchoring change in 
manufacturing. It is anchoring change in the global economy and we are not there yet.”  
 
Rising poverty and increasing inequality. Poverty rates are higher than in past decades. 
Particularly concerning is growing child poverty in all parts of the region. Child poverty 
has very long effects, stunting future educational attainment, earnings, and psychological 
wellbeing. Between 1990 and 2005 the incidence of child poverty increased from 24% to 
32% in the City of Toronto. A half-million children in the City of Toronto live in low-
income families (Polanyi et al. 2014). While the rates are lower, child poverty also roughly 
doubled in Mississauga, Oakville, and Brampton over the same period. Half of Ontario’s 
children in poverty live in the GTA (CAS 2008). Poverty is also experienced 
disproportionately by specific ethnic groups. The 2011 National Household Survey 
showed that in the City of Toronto, people of African, Caribbean, Middle Eastern, and 
Central Asian descent are considerably more likely to live in poverty than those descended 
from Europeans and East and Southeast Asians. To some degree this stems from how 
recently particular groups have immigrated as integration into social and economic life 
increases over time. Poverty negatively correlates with myriad social indicators. A recent 
report from Health Quality Ontario (2016) found that 28% of people in the poorest 
income quintile do not have access to enough food to meet basic dietary needs. Low-
income people are also at higher risk of chronic health conditions and have shorter life 
expectancies.  
  The increasing prevalence of poverty has accompanied rising income and wealth 
inequality.7 The Toronto census metropolitan area’s Gini Index—a common measure of 
inequality—for individuals and households has steadily increased since 1970, and by a 
larger amount than any other Canadian metropolitan area (United Way 2015: 39; Walks 
2015: 152). Most of the increase is the result of rising incomes at the high end, with a 
                                            
7 The existence of income and wealth inequality does not necessarily mean that those at the bottom are 
impoverished, nor does rising inequality necessarily correlate with rising poverty. Poverty and inequality are 
related, however, because government-led alleviation of poverty is funded through progressive taxation—
the burden of which falls disproportionately on those with higher incomes.  
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corresponding shrinking in the proportion of households with middle-range incomes 
(Walks 2010: 135). 
 
Declining social mobility and rising precarious employment, especially for youth and immigrants. 
The engine of the formation of the Toronto region’s postwar middle class was secure, often 
unionized, high-income manufacturing employment. Deindustrialization has transformed 
the nature of work in the region. The region’s labour market is divided between two kinds 
of service-sector jobs: those that are low-paying, less-skilled, and insecure, and high-paying, 
high-skilled “creative-class” jobs that are well-remunerated and confer benefits. Shahil 
Thomas’s assessment was direct: “There’s no middle area anymore—the labour market is 
split.”  
  Work has also become more precarious—temporary, without benefits, and with 
variable hours. On average, precarious workers earn considerably less than those with 
permanent jobs. Nationally, growth in part-time and low-wage employment has 
outstripped gains in full-time and high-paying jobs since the 1980s (Tal 2015). This is 
mirrored in the Toronto region. A recent study found that 18% of employed GTA 
residents have temporary or part-time jobs and more than half work at jobs that provide 
no security and benefits (PEPSO 2013, 2015). Older and less-educated workers are 
considerably more likely to be involuntarily unemployed, a gap that will increase with 
population ageing (TWIF 2015). Symptomatic of precarious employment is that the 
“working poor” constituted 9% of the working-age population in 2012—the highest rate 
among Canadian census metropolitan areas (Stapleton and Kay 2015).  
  Not all groups have experienced this transformation in the nature of work in the 
same way. The Martin Prosperity Institute reports that in the Toronto CMA, precarious 
routine-service-sector employment has increased dramatically since 2001, and is dominated 
by women, youth, the elderly, and new Canadians (MPI 2013). Disturbingly, a growing 
proportion of people with bachelor’s and graduate degrees are employed in the bottom tier 
of the service sector.  
  Immigrants and visible minorities are disproportionately represented among the 
precariously employed. “It used to be that immigrants would come here and they would 
catch up,” says Dennis Raphael. “Now we’re finding that they’re not. Statistics show that, 
for immigrants of colour, wages are lower even when you account for differences in 
language, training, and experience.” Juan Gomez also noted that the opportunities available 
to new immigrants and the next generation are very different from the early postwar 
period because there is no longer such great need for unskilled labour. Although Canada 
gives preference to migrants with high educational attainment and skills, labour-market 
integration is inhibited by unrecognized credentials and a lack of “Canadian experience,” 
that latter emanating from subtle or overt discrimination (Preston et al. 2011). 
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A growing gap between rich and poor neighbourhoods. Income inequality plays out 
geographically, separating “have” from “have-not” neighbourhoods. Echoing the work of 
University of Toronto academics David Hulchanski and Alan Walks, who have mapped a 
growing divide between rich and poor neighbourhoods in Canadian cities (Hulchanski 
2010; Walks 2010), Shahil Thomas and Richard Matern noted that low-income residents 
are increasingly concentrated in areas with poor transportation options, inadequate access 
to healthy food options, and limited employment opportunities (Matern 2014; Stapleton, 
Murphy, and Xing 2012; Wray 2013). Many of rental apartment tower communities are 
located in postwar suburban areas that are relatively amenity-poor. The United Way (2011: 
37) found that about 40% of high-rise apartment tenants were low-income in 2006. A 
growing number of low-income tenants are at risk of homelessness (Paradis, Wilson, and 
Logan 2014). Recent immigrant, racialized, and lone-parent families are disproportionately 
represented in the low-income and tenant populations. Dennis Raphael pointed to the 
many effects of poverty: “Look at the map of income. Then look at the map for diabetes, 
asthma, crime, sexual assault—they’re all the same map. Every health issue under the sun is 
correlated with income and precarious employment.”8 
The interaction of growing poverty rates and declining housing affordability is 
creating a new social geography in the region. Several workshop participants expressed a 
concern that the Toronto region will become like New York City or London, UK, where 
only the wealthy can afford to live in amenity-rich areas. Richard Matern explained that 
rising rents and housing costs are displacing low-income residents on a larger scale than 
before. Tom Smith put it succinctly: “People can’t afford to live and work in the City of 
Toronto any more. Affordability is pushing them out and congestion is pushing them back. 
Everyone is reacting to those two things.” 
 While much of the research on socio-economic and neighbourhood polarization 
has focused on the City of Toronto, the same dynamics are at work elsewhere in the 
region. Jocelyn Strutt described the situation in Hamilton, where poverty is concentrated 
in the downtown core while wealthy neighbourhoods tend to be in the suburbs. There, the 
city is working to mitigate the negative impacts of increased interest in downtown 
development on the city’s most vulnerable citizens—development that is in part spurred by 
the arrival of people who have been priced out of the Toronto market. Isolation and 
concentration of disadvantaged people in tower areas is as much a concern in Hamilton 
and Mississauga as it is in the City of Toronto.  
 
Declining housing affordability. Rising after-tax incomes, especially at the upper end of the 
income spectrum, as well as easy access to mortgage credit, have pulled housing prices 
upward, putting home ownership beyond the reach of many households. For most people, 
                                            
8 See Mikkonen and Raphael (2010); see also van Ingen et al. (2015). 
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incomes have not increased at the same pace as rents and house prices, undermining 
housing affordability (Burda 2013; Burleton 2015; Smetanin, Moca, and Yusuf 2015).  
 Property ownership drives wealth inequality. As long-time homeowners ride 
property values up, the wealth gap between them and non-property-owners increases. 
Those in the middle who entered the market by taking advantage of low interest rates and 
relaxed down-payment requirements carry large debt loads and are vulnerable to interest 
rate hikes or changes in personal circumstances, such as job loss or illness. Nationally, the 
the number of highly leveraged mortgages that do not qualify for CMHC mortgage 
insurance may soon overtake the number of insured ones (Watt 2015). At the end of 2009, 
total household debt was 2.1 times disposable income in the Toronto region, of which 
mortgage debt accounted for 72% (Walks 2013: 166–67). The same analysis showed that 
debt ratios are highest in gentrifying central-city areas and outer-suburban areas that are 
home to concentrations of immigrants, and lowest in high-income neighbourhoods.  
 There is consensus that large-scale international, and especially Chinese, investment 
in urban real estate assets is responsible for some portion of the housing affordability crisis. 
This is the dark side of Canada’s openness and stability. Toronto has become a magnet for 
investment by global high-net-worth individuals seeking a safe harbour for their capital. 
According to consultancy Knight Frank (2015), Toronto is regarded as a premier 
destination by the world’s wealthy. The region’s concentration of high-net-worth 
individuals exceeds Chicago and Los Angeles and is comparable to Shanghai, Paris, and 
Geneva. The National Bank of Canada estimates that $20 billion flowed from China into 
Toronto and Vancouver real estate in 2015 alone (McKenna 2016). Higher sale prices at 
the top end reduce affordability in the rest of the market because those squeezed out at the 
top drive up prices in lower tiers of the market. As the threshold to enter the ownership 
market increases, would-be purchasers turn to the rental market. Increased demand for 
rental housing in the absence of expanded supply drives up rents, but tenant incomes are 
not increasing to match. Little purpose-built public and private rental housing has been 
created in recent decades and the stock of both is deteriorating.9 Approximately 85,000 
households (about 174,000 people) and growing were on the active affordable housing 
waiting list in the City of Toronto at the end of 2015 (Housing Connections 2015) and 
the average emergency shelter stay was over 60 days in 2011 (Polanyi et al. 2014: 16).  
  Workshop participants also acknowledged other drivers of rising costs for new 
housing. Lloyd Cherniak pointed to rising public expectations: “People want to see large-
scale communities being built with all the bells and whistles from day one. The days when 
somebody started off on a small house and finished his own basement and suffered a little 
                                            
9 Real estate brokerages have reported a sudden increase nationwide in purpose-built rental housing 
construction as pension funds, REITs, and other investors are attracted by cheap borrowing, high rents (and 
therefore predictable rates of return), and robust demand for less expensive housing as high house prices 
place home ownership out of reach of many potential buyers (CBRE 2015; McMahon 2015). With a little 
over 1,000 rental starts annually in the Toronto region, however the number of units produced is small 
relative to overall demand. 
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bit are long gone.” Will Dunning pointed out that the Toronto region’s long-term rapid 
growth trajectory limits affordability simply because much of our housing stock is too new: 
“The private market is actually very good at providing affordable ownership and rental 
housing, it just that takes them 60 to 80 years to build them.”  
  Cherniak, Dunning, and Frank Clayton also voiced the industry’s concern about 
overly lengthy approval processes and regulatory burdens that drive up costs and limit 
housing production. From this perspective, the regional housing market is subject to policy 
constraints that limit the creation of sufficient supply to meet demand for specific housing 
types and neighbourhood environments.  
 Housing unaffordability may drive some residents’ location choices. Between 2001 
and 2006, over 250,000 people left the City of Toronto to settle in other municipalities in 
the GTA, Simcoe County, and Waterloo Region (Wilson 2009: 7–8), although more 
recent figures suggest that the outflow slowed in the second half of the last decade 
(City of Toronto 2014a). (The population of the City of Toronto, and of the region as a 
whole, have continued to grow because domestic out-migration has been offset by 
international immigration.) Households appear to moving outwards in search of housing 
that is less expensive in both absolute terms and also in relation to property size.   
 
Escalating rents squeeze out community assets. Separately, several participants raised concern 
about the lack of protection for other kinds of land uses. For example, participants in the 
society-themed workshop urged policymakers to think holistically about the physical 
requirements of community-based functions such as schools and non-profit social service 
organizations. Samir Sinha pointed to the transformation of Toronto’s core 
neighbourhoods, where gentrification and redevelopment have driven up the rents paid by 
non-profit agencies that rely on fixed grants to provide services to vulnerable groups. 
Higher costs force agencies to move to cheaper locations, which disrupts care networks 
and results in underserved populations. He cited the example of an organization that runs a 
dementia day program: 
They have received funding from the Ministry to double the number of people 
they support in their community. The problem is that they are working above an 
old building with limited space. … They can’t [expand their space] to serve more 
clients—they’re landlocked. So they embarked on what became a two-year journey 
to find more space in the same neighbourhood. They eventually had to move their 
day program much further west and north because of skyrocketing property prices.  
While the organization’s capacity was expanded, it was now located beyond the reach of 
many of its clients. Dr. Sinha stated that his hospital emergency room has experienced a 
37% rise in the number of visits by older patients in only five years, because they lack 
other options. This story reveals a gap in the process of creating and maintaining complete 
communities, especially in infill and redevelopment contexts.  
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An inflexible built environment. It is costly to change urban form and supporting infrastructure 
after it is constructed. While the Toronto region is growing rapidly, a large proportion of its 
urban footprint was developed in accordance with early-postwar planning ideas that 
emphasized the separation of non-residential from residential uses, and high-density from 
low-density housing. These ideas produced a built environment that is less resilient to 
social, economic, and environmental changes because it lacks diversity and redundancy. 
The result is a highly planned suburban landscape that performs poorly on a variety of 
social and environmental indicators: overreliance on the automobile to access employment, 
shopping, schools, and other amenities, and less efficient use of energy. This contrasts with 
less rigidly organized prewar urban landscapes, whose mixed-use form, fine-grained parcel 
structures and street systems, and more flexible zoning enable variable adaptations. Since 
the 1990s, aspects of new suburban neighbourhoods have been planned in ways the mimic 
some prewar characteristics, however analysis suggests that their performance is similar to 
that of earlier postwar neighbourhoods (Hess and Sorensen 2015; Taylor and Van Nostrand 
2008). More recently constructed neighbourhoods are less mixed-use, more uniform in 
their range of house types, and less dense than those constructed in the 1960s. They are 
also designed with street systems that are less connected and less grid-like, which inhibits 
efficient travel by foot, cycling, and transit.  
It is too early to tell if the “complete communities” policies adopted by the 
province and municipalities over the past decade for new urban developments on rural 
land will produce built environments that perform as well as prewar neighbourhoods (see 
box “Complete communities”). Hess and Sorensen (2015: 148) conclude that  
more ambitious approaches will be necessary to create the ‘complete communities’ 
…. It seems clear that to achieve this will require strategies to influence both 
employment and retail location, issues that were hardly mentioned in [the Growth 
Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe]. Changing the pattern of development 
will also require a reconsideration of the role of the arterial roads grid and the 
super-blocks that it creates, which have continued to be the fundamental planning 
and urban form frameworks for new growth in the region.  
Complete communities 
The 2006 Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe defines “complete communities” as 
follows: 
“Complete communities meet people's needs for daily living throughout an entire lifetime by 
providing convenient access to an appropriate mix of jobs, local services, a full range of housing, 
and community infrastructure including affordable housing, schools, recreation and open space for 
their residents. Convenient access to public transportation and options for safe, non-motorized 
travel is also provided.” (s. 7, Definitions) 
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It is also unclear whether the intensification of established residential areas will produce 
more complete communities.  While large-scale master-planned zones such as the West 
Don Lands may achieve this ideal by virtue of public land ownership, selective recruitment 
of anchor businesses and services, and the advanced provision of transit services, parcel-by-
parcel intensification projects may not contribute to fulfilling regional policy objectives, 
such as the more efficient use of existing infrastructure and services. For example, a recent 
Neptis Foundation analysis found that only 20% of new dwelling units and 13% of new 
residents in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area between 2001 and 2011 were located 
near subway stations or designated Metrolinx hubs (Burchfield and Kramer 2015: 59; 
Taylor, Burchfield, and Kramer 2014: 31). 
While sometimes catalyzed by public action, existing urban areas are transformed 
mostly through private investment. Aderonke Akande suggested that there is a risk of 
selective attention in infill and redevelopment processes. As the public and private 
resources available to “reprogram” poorly performing neighbourhood environments are 
limited, they cannot flow everywhere: “How do you enable transformative change in the 
areas of the city that are not of interest to private-sector investors? … This is where a lot of 
the towers are located. Those areas were designed in an era when the zoning was almost 
exclusively residential. Now you have a population that is living there that does not own a 
car. The needs are different.” The City of Toronto is working to diversify ageing rental 
residential tower areas by creating incentives to retrofit buildings to increase their energy 
efficiency and extend their operational life while improving safety and access to food and 
recreational amenities. Toronto’s adoption of a new Residential Apartment Commercial 
zoning category in 2014 may extend the scope of tower renewal by permitting new 
commercial, recreational, and community uses in tower neighbourhoods originally 
designed to be exclusively residential spaces. The promotion of mixed-use development in 
these areas represents the diversification of the apartment neighbourhood “portfolio,” one 
that may increase the resilience of their built form over time. 
 Contemporary planning orthodoxy aspires to a greater mix of uses, yet existing 
land-use patterns and zoning practices lock in a use-segregated built environment. At least 
half of all jobs are located on lands zoned exclusively for employment uses—that is, for 
commercial, industrial, and logistics activities (Hemson Consulting 2005: 44). Exclusive 
employment zoning was and is intended to protect residential areas from incompatible and 
noxious uses, yet its effect is to reinforce automobile commuting. Similarly, the 
consolidation of retail establishments into highway- or arterial-oriented “power centres” 
separated from the residential urban fabric undermines access by walking, cycling, or transit 
(Buliung and Hernandez 2013). Exclusive employment and retail zoning and the 
preservation of underutilized lands may inhibit future adaptation to economic and 
technological change. Matthias Sweet urged a regional policy focus on “special places”—
those “where intensification can deliver more value for the developer and create potential 
for more and better jobs.” 
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Exploring interconnected risks and policy conflicts 
The workshop participants agreed that while the Toronto region possesses many assets, it 
also has vulnerabilities that may undermine its social, economic, and environmental 
resilience to external risks that are mostly, if not entirely, beyond the control of provincial 
and local government, including macroeconomic conditions, climate change, and macro-
demographic shifts (see Table 3). The governance challenge is to anticipate and mitigate 
risks by reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities. The regional economy, society, natural and 
built environments, and fiscal-governmental system can be viewed as portfolios of assets 
whose emergent vulnerabilities may be interpreted as an erosion of diversity and 
redundancy. 
The workshop discussions revealed the complex interconnectedness of domains 
that are often considered separately. Focusing attention on these sites of intersection will 
provide the greatest returns on investment because interventions will provide mutually 
reinforcing benefits across domains. As foreshadowed in Part 1, the built environment—
over which local governments have considerable influence—emerges as the pivotal site at 
which risks and vulnerabilities intersect, and where the greatest returns may be achieved. 
We conclude this diagnostic scan with an exploratory discussion of several potential 
points of intersection, as well as points at which policy objectives may come into conflict. 
The discussion is not exhaustive, but it raises the kinds of questions that might inform 
anticipatory governance processes.  
 
Is reliance on international migration a source of risk? The region’s population growth depends 
almost entirely on international migration. Without it, the population of the Toronto 
region’s core, suburbs, and the region as a whole, would decrease in absolute terms. 
International migration also slows population ageing relative to other parts of Canada. 
Toronto’s ability to attract migrants depends on its ability to deliver quality of life and 
absorb them into the labour market. Both are under threat due to suboptimal built-
environment and infrastructural variables (unaffordable housing and long commutes) and 
socio-economic variables (elevated poverty rates and barriers to stable and well-
remunerated work). The Toronto region risks economic decline and increased poverty and 
inequality if its value proposition to migrants diminishes relative to other places. On the 
other hand, some participants argued that Toronto’s attractiveness is assured by the presence 
of established emigre communities and its relative stability and performance compared to 
other parts of the world. Banking on this may be another emanation of complacency, 
however, exposing the region to risk. What is clear is that the region’s economic and social 
health are closely hitched to continued immigration and successful settlement.  
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Table 3: Summary of the Toronto region’s assets, vulnerabilities, and risks 
 Domain 
 
Economic  
Natural and built 
environment  
Social  
Fiscal-
governmental  
External risks Technological 
innovation 
Business cycle 
Exchange rate  
Interest rates 
Foreign direct 
investment 
decisions 
Factor costs 
(energy) 
Climate change 
(impact on water 
systems, extreme 
weather events, 
temperature) 
Migration 
(international, 
domestic, intra-
metropolitan) 
Population ageing  
Unpredictable 
federal and 
provincial fiscal 
and policy 
support 
     
Internal 
vulnerabilities 
Infrastructure 
deficit 
Weak innovation 
system 
Low productivity 
Inflexible built 
environment 
Vulnerable 
infrastructure 
(energy, 
stormwater 
management) 
Rising inequality, 
poverty 
Neighbourhood 
polarization 
Declining social 
mobility 
Declining housing 
affordability 
Ageing affordable 
housing stock 
Displacement of 
community 
organizations 
Complacency 
Barriers to inter-
municipal 
collective action 
Tax base erosion 
Public and 
political 
resistance to 
taxation  
Assets Agglomeration 
Growth 
Economic 
diversity 
Proximity to 
markets 
Inland location 
Access to fresh 
water 
Arable land 
 
Tolerance 
Social diversity 
High educational 
attainment 
Political stability 
Honest 
government 
Relative fiscal 
prudence 
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How might population ageing and inequality undermine fiscal capacity to mitigate future risks? The 
external risks discussed will interact in ways that may have profound impacts on tax effort 
and incidence, with implications for the timing of investment. Much of the money that 
will be spent maintaining, replacing, and building new infrastructure will be borrowed, and 
over long terms. This is sensible as interest rates are at historic lows and borrowing enables 
costs to spread over the lifetime of the asset it funds. The money to repay the principal and 
interest to lenders will come from future revenues.  
As labour force participation declines due to population ageing and automation, 
federal and provincial governments may experience erosion of personal income tax 
revenues. This will occur even as demand for health care increases. Forecasts suggest that 
personal retirement savings and public and private pensions will be insufficient to maintain 
quality of life as longevity increases. Elder poverty may increase in the absence of expanded 
public income supports, which must be funded through payroll contributions or general 
taxation. Increasing the eligibility age for benefits would recognize the capacity of healthy 
older people to work longer and reduce fiscal stress by turning recipients into contributors. 
(In this context, the Ontario government’s move to introduce an expanded contributory 
pension scheme is sensible, while the federal government’s reduction of the Old Age 
Security eligibility age is not.) Municipal property tax revenues may also decline because 
seniors’ propensity to move and purchasing power declines as they age, driving down 
property values (Takáts 2010). Rising income and wealth inequality may also erode 
support for general progressive taxation and income redistribution. Some political 
sociologists have argued that support for income redistribution will decline if politics 
becomes framed as a zero-sum battle between “makers” and “takers” (Banting and Myles 
2013; Green, Riddell, and St-Hilaire 2016). 
In this context, governments at all levels may come to rely increasingly on user fees 
and consumption taxes, the regressive nature of which will disproportionately burden the 
less well-off, exacerbating poverty and inequality. This raises the question of whether 
governments should raise more revenues now to finance present and future investments 
because the money may not be available later.  
 
How can built environments be made more resilient? The creation of so-called “complete 
communities” is an important goal of provincial land-use policies. The Growth Plan calls 
for neighbourhoods to be “well-designed, offer transportation choices, accommodate 
people at all stages of life and have the right mix of housing, a good range of jobs, and easy 
access to stores and services to meet daily needs” and for “community infrastructure” to be 
planned in concert with land use. There is a risk, however, that framing the “completeness” 
of neighbourhoods as a fixed, near-term end-state will inhibit adaptation to changing 
circumstances. Resilient neighbourhoods must be planned not only for the needs of 
residents of today, but also for the needs of those who may live there in 20, 50, and 100 
years. Planning with the area’s future residents in mind may reduce the problems associated 
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with inflexible built environments highlighted by Aderonke Akande (tower 
neighbourhoods) and Samir Sinha (senior-unfriendly residential environments). The future, 
however, is uncertain. The challenge is to imagine urban built environments that can adapt 
to perform well under a variety of possible futures. As discussed in Part 1, one approach is 
to think of neighbourhoods as portfolios of assets, the composition of which may evolve as 
conditions change without compromising the quality of life of residents or their 
contribution to the region’s economic productivity.  
Adaptation may be enabled in several ways. First, buildings and neighbourhoods 
can be constructed to accommodate a broad range of occupancy and use patterns. Dennis 
Raphael and Samir Sinha pointed to the importance of creating buildings and 
neighbourhoods whose physical program is flexible and multifunctional. Raphael pointed 
to the St. Lawrence neighbourhood as Toronto’s best example of a district that combines 
diverse uses, often within a single building: schools, ownership and rental housing, small 
businesses, and community facilities such as libraries and social service agencies. Viewing 
neighbourhood-scale built environments as portfolios is a way of understanding why some 
neighbourhoods maintain their stability while others decline. Fine-grained and diversified 
urban form may enable more successful adaptation to changing circumstances over time, 
including the needs of an ageing population, than single-use and undifferentiated built 
environments. This prescription has affinities with Jane Jacobs’s argument in The Death and 
Life of Great American Cities (1961) that successful cities evolve in a condition of “organized 
complexity.”  
Renée Gomes explained that Waterfront Toronto is encouraging flexibility by 
requiring minimum ground floor heights in condo buildings to permit future commercial 
uses and LEED Gold compliance to reduce future maintenance costs. Similarly, Diego 
Morettin described his experience with hospital design: 
You try to keep in mind that you’re in a 40-year cycle, changes in practice, in 
disease, in things you don’t know might happen, and you want to make sure that 
your infrastructure can handle those changes. We’ve seen a huge shift in policy 
regarding the resilience of buildings. As an example, we used to design a building 
that would have emergency power for critical systems only, such as people on life 
support, whereas now we see building infrastructure designed with redundancy to 
support operations and services during a wider range of adverse events. 
The discussion revealed a tension between understanding flexibility as deregulation and the 
use of regulation to promote flexibility. Tom Smith remarked, “You can’t be too 
prescriptive. You have to harness the momentum and layer things on top of that.” Dennis 
Raphael offered a caution, however. Relaying a story of a developer refusing an offer of 
extra density to build affordable units, he said that sometimes incentives do not work even 
if they are generous because developers do not want the responsibility: “Sometimes you 
have to regulate.” 
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This leads to a second point: the need for flexible community facilities that can 
evolve as neighbourhood population profiles and conditions change. These facilities may 
be thought of as portfolio of productive assets with variable and evolving components. 
School enrolments and demand for children’s daycare and elderly long-term care services 
fluctuate on a generational time horizon. Viewing each function in isolation is short 
sighted. Instead they should be understood as a portfolio of community assets whose 
composition changes over time. If the physical space that houses these functions was 
protected, it could be adapted to meet changing needs. Workshop participants presented an 
image of a flexible space—perhaps several floors of a mixed-use building—that could be 
transformed from a school and daycare to a provider of adult and senior day programs and 
back again over the lifetime of the building. Samir Sinha and Richard Matern suggested 
that the physical space occupied by social services agencies should be protected or 
subsidized to avoid displacement when their rents increase. “Remove that obstacle,” Sinha 
said, “make sure that the land cost is not the barrier for service providers.” The province is 
taking preliminary steps in this direction as it develops a “community hubs” strategy for 
the more flexible use of existing public facilities such as schools and community centres, 
including the colocation and integration of non-profit social service organizations (Pitre 
2015). 
 
Resilient urban form 
The notion of designing “complete communities” to perform well under a range of potential future 
conditions is consonant with the findings of a recent project by the London School of Economics on 
the resilience of urban form (Smith 2013). They conceptualized “resilience” as “the conditions of 
both urban form and its management over time that enable localities to persist in attracting and 
generating use and value and/or to adapt in order to remain viable and productive” (7). The 
research team looked at the historical development and evolution of eight urban districts of various 
ages, including London’s Mayfair and Belgravia; New York’s Hudson Square; Reston, Virginia; Irvine, 
California; Opéra in Paris; and Singapore’s Chinatown. They conclude that resilient urban form: 
• sustains sufficient density to make adequate use of infrastructure and support a diversity of uses 
while not inhibiting the economic, social, and cultural potentialities of the public realm; 
• integrates different transport options with diverse street-based activities; 
• permits change in use over time in ways that facilitate and enhance economically sustainable use; 
• incorporates publicly accessible and biodiverse green and open space; 
• accommodates diverse tenure types to share resources and amenities across socio-economic 
groups; and 
• has stable property values over time. 
They conclude that the planning and design of resilient urban districts requires long-term 
anticipation of possible change at the urban scale, as well as careful stewardship of private property 
and the public realm to enable positive evolution. 
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Third, the portfolio metaphor can also be applied to urban open spaces. Workshop 
participants Brenda Webster and Yvonne Yeung described a growing “green infrastructure” 
movement in landscape architecture and environmental design to introduce diversity into 
specific features and projects by making them multifunctional (Ahern 2011; Arup 2014a; 
Brown et al. 2015). For example, public green space may be designed to function as a 
recreational amenity for a variety of age groups, a storm water management system, a flood 
and urban heat island mitigation device, a multi-modal mobility corridor, a species habitat, 
a carbon sink, and a catalyst for neighbourhood-scale investment. Viewed this way, a 
humble neighbourhood park can be understood as a portfolio that delivers immediate 
social, public health, economic, and environmental benefits while mitigating future risks. 
Processes for siting, sizing, and designing urban open spaces should consider all of the 
services they provide.  
 
Is it possible to create appropriate financial incentives to create desirable development patterns 
without imposing undue burdens on those least able to pay? The recurring themes of how to 
finance infrastructure expansion and replacement in ways that promote desirable urban 
development patterns and positive social outcomes are closely intertwined. Cherise Burda 
and Craig Applegath argued for the renovation of the existing public finance system. They 
argued that some forms of hard infrastructure, such as sewer, water, and road systems, have 
been shown to operate at a loss in low-density suburbs, meaning that high-density areas 
subsidize low-density areas. Applegath called for the replacement of municipality-wide 
average-cost pricing of services with location-specific true-cost pricing: “Stop subsidizing 
suburbs. It costs the taxpayer more overall. If we make the suburbs unaffordable, people 
will get over their fear of density.” Burda applied this to transportation, noting that “we’re 
used to driving for free”—when in fact the costs of roads and associated infrastructure are 
funded out of general revenues. Hilary Holden, in a discussion about the economic cost of 
delays to goods movement on congested roads, offered what she called a “simple solution: 
you have to price people out to make that congestion go away so you can get the freight 
traffic moving. You need to get more people paying the externalities of their driving trips.” 
Echoing longstanding economic thought, Frank Clayton argued that user-pay is the best 
approach: “As much as possible all infrastructure should be financed through user charges. 
If you can find the beneficiaries, they should be paying for it.” 
An unresolved difficulty with removing perverse incentives and embracing user-
pay is that its impact is likely regressive. The impacts of true-cost pricing and user-pay will 
be felt most intensely by residents who lack the current income and accumulated savings 
to alter their housing and travel choices. Matti Siemiatycki noted that increasing or 
diversifying the application of user fees cannot come at the expense of social equity: “You 
need to make sure that those at lower end of the income spectrum are not adversely 
impacted” through progressive income redistribution and means-tested rebates.  
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Beyond this, it is unclear what will happen to inefficient urban form when it is 
made more expensive. Will its value decline as people move to more efficient locations? 
Will it become a preserve for those who can afford to pay for inefficiency, thereby rising in 
value? Or will it attract transformative public and private investment that reduces its 
operating costs? As discussed, existing built environments are difficult and costly to change. 
Poorly performing urban environments do not simply disappear. 
 Separately, some workshop participants advocated for capturing increases in land 
value induced by redevelopment and infrastructure expansion to pay for up-front capital 
expenditures. Frank Clayton argued that Ontario’s current value property assessment 
system already does this well: “Use the current market value assessment. Anything that 
improves the value of land or buildings, be it transit going in, or roads going in—current 
value assessment accounts for it.” Tom Smith argued for a simple extraction of value at the 
time of re-zoning: “For intensifying along transit corridors, you do it at the time of re-
zoning. Move the zoning from x to y and take some percentage of that value increase as a 
payment.” Discussing Markham’s strategy, Yvonne Yeung emphasized how getting the 
design fundamentals right—energy efficiency, tree plantings, a strong public realm, and the 
early delivery of community facilities—attracts high-value development. Similarly, Brenda 
Webster discussed how Waterfront Toronto’s early design and installation of parks and 
other community assets, before even the buildings were begun, generated public interest 
and solidified the value proposition for private developers. The fundamental incentive, 
then, is to encourage high-value development in order to maximize land-value uplift. 
Indeed, the Urban Land Institute makes the case for resilience on the basis of the financial 
returns it produces (McCormick and Marshall 2015).  
The difficulty of a financing strategy based on land-value capture is that it may 
exacerbate housing unaffordability and further displace nongovernmental community 
service agencies. One solution is to use regulation to require developers to incorporate less 
expensive units in their projects. (Indeed, the province’s proposed Promoting Affordable 
Housing Act would strengthen municipal powers to do so.) Yet regulation in the absence of 
public subsidy either drives up the cost of the other units or produces very small units that 
accommodate only certain types of households. Another solution is to expand public 
ownership of housing and buildings containing private and non-profit community 
facilities. This is unlikely to occur without raising taxes.  
  This is related to a second difficulty—the potential unrecoverability of capital costs 
and the potential need for permanent operating subsidy. In essence, growth may not be 
able to pay for growth. Matthias Sweet noted that transit is a difficult nut to crack because 
all rides are subsidized: “There are no really good rates of return for the private sector in 
financing the capital side of transit. You need to look at the value creation beyond fares.” 
The same is true of social housing—its purpose is to be run at a loss, for if its residents 
could pay its true cost a subsidy would not be required. A more profound uncertainty-
driven risk is that many infrastructure improvements and redevelopment projects may 
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never repay their cost. As many American jurisdictions that experimented with tax-
increment financing have discovered, increased property tax revenue due to land-value 
uplift often falls short of expectations. Some of the most expensive infrastructure and 
facility projects involve replacement rather than expansion. These interventions are 
unlikely to generate increased land values and so must be funded from general rather than 
incremental revenues.  
3. The political challenge: selling resilience 
Workshop participants acknowledged that proactive resilience-oriented policymaking and 
planning will be a hard political sell. The range and scale of upfront investment in hard 
infrastructure and soft services envisioned would require significant modification to the 
current system of taxation and expenditure, and would run up against public skepticism 
regarding the efficacy and efficiency of government. This paper concludes with a reflection 
on the potential foundations of a new public narrative to support investment in the service 
of a more resilient economy, society, and environment.  
 
Focus on quality of life, not crisis response. All too often spending is presented to the public as 
an urgent response to crisis or in terms of individual economic self-interest. The 
experience of other jurisdictions suggests that basing public appeals on collective quality of 
life may be more effective at mobilizing support for expenditure. 
 Workshop participants debated whether a crisis narrative is needed to spur action 
on social, economic, and fiscal problems and risks. Some argued, for example, that a crisis 
narrative is necessary to mobilize public support for extreme weather event readiness. The 
problem is that not all issues are reducible to crisis, and the impacts of crises are not evenly 
distributed across society. People who are most at risk—such as the poor, the elderly, recent 
immigrants—may have the least voice. Crisis narratives may also favour a reactive rather 
than proactive posture. Acting only in times of crisis, such as economic recession, disease 
outbreak, or infrastructure failure, may lead to spending that is non-strategic, is sporadic 
rather than consistent, and does not increase positive spin-off effects. The Toronto region 
has also seen appeals to individual utilitarian self-interest—for example, CivicAction’s 
“what would you do with 32?” campaign. Again, the impacts of diffuse problems such as 
high congestion-induced commute times fall unevenly across society. Those with the 
greatest resources and voice may have the least to gain.  
  An alternative approach is to make a broad appeal to enhanced quality of life. The 
advantage of a quality-of-life framing is its potential to bridge social, economic, and 
environmental domains and highlight the interconnectedness of risks and vulnerabilities. 
Andrew Pietriwicz identified quality of life with the reliability of infrastructure and 
services, suggesting that this may be a fruitful way of building support for redundant 
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systems. Matthias Sweet framed the economic costs of Toronto’s current transportation 
congestion problems in quality-of-life terms: “If you live in Mississauga and you work in 
Toronto and there’s no transit, you’re just going to sit in traffic and you’re going to hate 
your life. In order to compensate somebody for hating life you’re going to have to increase 
their wages over the long-term. So quality of life issues are economic issues because it has 
to do with the price of labour.”  
Vancouver’s experience is instructive. In the early 1970s, regional planning was on 
shaky footing. The old technical methods of land-use and infrastructure planning, which 
narrowly focused on efficiency criteria, had lost legitimacy. Much as in the former City of 
Toronto in the same period, reform candidates captured city council on a program of 
improving quality of life by stopping highway construction and slum clearance projects. 
Reflecting this ethos at the regional scale, the Greater Vancouver Regional District 
(GVRD) embarked on an unprecedented “Urban Futures” survey that reached thousands 
of residents. The result was a reframing of social, economic, and environmental issues in 
relation to a “livability” narrative that laid the foundation for positive actions rather than 
stopping negative ones. Broad-based public engagement was repeated when successor 
regional plans were developed in the late 1980s–early 1990s and late-2000s. The adoption 
of mass outreach and inclusive processes have been credited with generating broad public 
support for the GVRD’s planning policies, while also bringing organized interests on-side 
(see Cameron and Simon 2014; Harcourt, Cameron, and Rossiter 2007). Similar mass 
engagement exercises have occurred in some American regions, including Portland, 
Oregon, and Salt Lake City, Utah (Fregonese and Gabbe 2011; Hopkins and Zapata 2007).  
These exercises have several characteristics in common. First, the objective of 
Vancouver’s regional planning processes was to maintain and increase quality of life. 
Second, each used contrasting long-term scenarios to frame collective discussion and 
mobilize support for action. Scenarios incorporated variables across domains, highlighting 
the intersection of economic, social, and environmental risks and vulnerabilities. Such an 
approach is compatible with the exploratory scenario planning technique described in 
Part 1. Evidence-based scenarios can be used not only to identify negative impacts and 
positive returns in order to target investments, but also to increase stakeholder and public 
knowledge and mobilize public support around solutions. 
   Despite having developed an elaborate system of institutionalized consultation 
with the public and organized stakeholders in relation to discrete plans, policies, and 
projects, Ontario has not engaged in direct civic engagement at the regional scale. 
 
Making the case for investment. In exploring the unwillingness of governments to borrow or 
increase taxes, Matti Siemiatycki suggested that a generalized lack of understanding of fiscal 
concepts exacerbates public finance constraints. One way out is for leaders to make a firm 
distinction between investment and spending. Good investments create assets that generate 
returns and value. “Spending,” by contrast, is ephemeral. Siemiatycki also argued that the 
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public must also understand the distinction between funding by governments and financing 
by lenders. Borrowing to amortize upfront costs creates an incentive to ensure that 
investments are productive. These distinctions can be clarified to the public by making a 
distinction between capital and operating expenditure. Municipalities already do this, 
although this is not widely understood by the public. (Municipal operating budgets must 
be balanced every year; the capital budget may be funded by debt.) The federal and 
provincial governments, however, combine the two. It would be easier to make the 
distinction between ephemeral spending and the creation of durable assets if they are 
separately accounted for. While this concept has been criticized in some quarters (see 
Dachis and Robson 2014), keeping two sets of books could make it easier for the province 
to make the case for investing in productive infrastructure assets without being 
undermined by accusations of wasteful spending.  
  Workshop participants also emphasized the importance of transparent analysis of 
proposed investments. Siemiatycki stressed the importance of being able to assess and 
prioritize infrastructure projects according to the benefits they will deliver. Distinguishing 
between investment and spending on the level of rhetoric accomplishes nothing: “investing 
in unproductive infrastructure projects is still wasteful spending. You need to put money 
into the right projects.” In other countries including New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, infrastructure proposals are evaluated and funding is allocated on the basis of 
their business case—an assessment of how the economic and social benefits and 
incremental revenues balance against the costs over the lifetime of the project. This 
informs the question of whether public and private investments can be paid back through 
incremental revenues within a reasonable amount of time (i.e., the amortization period of 
debt incurred or a P3 concession). As in the United Kingdom, business cases can also be 
used as a means of prioritizing investments within a competitive funding environment.  
  A transparent business case approach for infrastructure or urban development 
projects may reveal the inefficiency of current practices and create incentives to think in 
terms of productive investment rather than spending. Frank Clayton decried the narrow 
way in which City of Toronto staff reports communicate the fiscal impact of decisions. A 
report on a major development application may state “no fiscal impact,” even though it 
may induce substantial property tax revenues. A recent controversial study by City of 
Calgary staff concluded that new suburban divisions would not “turn a profit”—that is, 
generate sufficient incremental property tax revenue to offset up-front public infrastructure 
expenditures—for eleven years (Markusoff 2014). Without context the public cannot assess 
whether this is a reasonable time lag or a symptom of inefficient development patterns. 
A potential downside of the business case approach is that governments seeking to 
delay investment may use requests for refinements to the evidence base as a stalling 
mechanism. Hilary Holden recounted that there is a transparency gap in the UK because 
business cases prepared by proponents for central government funding are not necessarily 
made public. Business cases are prepared by civil servants to inform decision makers but 
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ultimately investment decisions are political. A further dilemma is how to incorporate non-
fiscal benefits into the business case. As Matthias Sweet put it, prioritizing the fiscal return 
on investment leads to different decisions than if the goal is to improve mobility as a social 
good. The general message, however, was clear: the public decision to invest must in some 
way be tied to the fiscal, social, economic, and environmental performance—which may 
be construed as resilience—of the proposed asset. Transparent disclosure of potential 
returns will not only facilitate prioritization of interventions; it will also help communicate 
their importance to a skeptical public.  
Conclusion 
This paper applies a resilience lens to evaluate the Toronto region’s assets and 
vulnerabilities, and draws lessons of use to municipal and provincial policymakers as they 
review and amend the provincial and municipal framework for land-use planning and 
infrastructure investment. It also endeavours to connect land-use and infrastructure 
questions to other policy domains in relation to recognized risks and sources of 
uncertainty. To do so, we synthesized insights on the Toronto region from a diverse range 
of professionals and published literature, and also from academic and other published works 
on resilience. The objective was neither to engage in speculative futurism nor to argue, like 
Chicken Little, that the sky is falling. Rather, the result of this project is a sometimes 
provocative reflection on the region’s assets, vulnerabilities, and challenges; an investigation 
into potential gaps in policy content and process; and a window on alternative ways of 
viewing generally accepted problems. 
 The workshop participants agreed that decisions made today have potentially long-
term effects, and so we must accept uncertainty, manage risks, and be prepared to adapt. 
Juan Gomez remarked that “we really do need to get our fundamentals right because we 
can’t predict.” To reiterate Toby Lennox’s remark cited earlier, “We didn’t know what 
would happen in 50 or 100 years. The one thing we did know is that if we didn’t get the 
first 20 years right, the next 20 years wouldn’t really matter.” In this vein, Andrew 
Pietrewicz invoked U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who once said “plans are 
worthless; planning is everything.” Pietrewicz summed up the challenge of anticipatory 
governance: “we will never know what the future needs are, so it’s a matter of maintaining 
options. The planning has to be routinely revisited so that we’re better able to change 
along the way.”  
Incorporating the potential for adaptation to social, economic, and environmental 
change into planning processes is a precondition of resilience. This is true at the scale of 
the building, the parcel, the neighbourhood, the municipality, and the region. Redundancy 
and diversity enable adaptation. Faisal Moola used the example of a keystone species, 
49 
without which an ecosystem collapses. Having other options, or redundant capacities, 
enables the system to continue to function under stress.  
  Finally, much discussion concerned the current political impasse regarding how 
best to finance and expand overdue hard and soft infrastructure of all kinds. The discussion 
pointed toward the need for a new public narrative, one that portrays wise capital spending 
as an investment, and links it to quality of life improvements. Much depends on leaders’ 
ability to communicate the need for social and economic investment. As George 
McCarthy, the president of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, recently remarked: “We 
have to … rebuild the understanding in the general population of the role of local 
government and why it is necessary and good to pay taxes, or otherwise the provision of 
public goods would not happen” (Kredell 2015). Without renewed investment, the 
Toronto region’s vulnerabilities may eclipse its considerable assets, undermining its 
resilience to economic, social, and environmental risks. 
 
Note to the reader  
After this paper was completed the provincial government released proposed revisions to the 
Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, the Greenbelt Plan, the Oak Ridges Moraine 
Conservation Plan, and the Niagara Escarpment Plan. These proposed documents, which are 
available from the government’s Places to Grow website, contain a number of changes that align 
with some of the ideas presented in this paper. These include: 
• When planning new or expanded infrastructure systems, municipalities would be required to 
undertake long-term scenario-based evaluation of the financial viability of assets over their 
complete life cycle. Also, settlement area expansions would only be permitted if supported by a 
viable financing plan for infrastructure and public service facilities (including education, social 
services, health care, and protective services that receive government funding).  
• Master planning for water and wastewater infrastructure would take into account climate change 
impacts, including forecast changes to precipitation volume and intensity. 
• Municipalities would be required to undertake, with public and private partners, integrated 
planning for public service facilities, including the co-location of schools with other community 
functions in “hubs.” In the proposed plans, public service facilities are discussed as integral to 
complete communities. 
• Municipalities would be expected to plan to achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions and 
mitigate climate change impacts in part through urban and rural land-use and infrastructure 
planning.  
These and other changes, and the degree to which the revisions integrate policy objectives across 
domains, are encouraging developments. Still, much hinges on implementation. The proposed 
plans place new substantive requirements and procedural burdens on municipalities. As the plans’ 
objectives cannot be realized without the support of local government leaders, private-sector 
stakeholders, and the public, the provincial government must take care to explain the long-term 
benefits of its policies and cultivate broad support. 
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Appendix: Workshop process and participants 
Four workshops were held between February 17 and 20, 2015, with between five and 
eight participants in each. Participants were recruited on the basis of their expertise so that 
each group represented a broad range of professions and knowledge bases. We specifically 
sought “doers”—experienced people directly engaged in professional practice rather than 
the leaders of organizations. We also sought geographic representation from different parts 
of the Toronto region. Each workshop was three hours long. The project leaders facilitated 
the discussion by posing questions, but allowed it to unfold organically. The discussions 
were recorded and transcribed by research assistants affiliated with the University of 
Toronto’s Program in Planning. With the assistance of project partner the Urban Land 
Institute, the workshops were hosted by the national interdisciplinary planning and design 
consultancy DIALOG. ULI–Toronto’s Executive Director and DIALOG staff with 
relevant expertise were invited to participate in the discussions. Participants’ affiliations are 
listed as they were at the time of the workshops and, if changed, as they were at the time of 
publication. Previous affiliations are also indicated where relevant.  
 
Fiscal Resilience Workshop – Tuesday, February 17, 2015 
Lloyd Cherniak, Vice President, Lebovic Enterprises 
Frank Clayton, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Urban Research and Land 
Development, Ryerson University 
Hilary Holden, then Head of Transportation Consulting in Canada, Arup; now Director, 
Transit and Sustainable Transportation, City of Toronto 
Richard Joy, Executive Director, ULI Toronto 
Matti Siemiatycki, Associate Professor, University of Toronto Program in Planning 
Robert Hatton, Director, Strategic Initiatives & Intergovernmental Finance, City of 
Toronto was unable to attend the workshop and was interviewed separately 
 
Environmental Resilience Workshop – Wednesday, February 18, 2015 
Aderonke Akande, Project Manager, Tower and Neighbourhood Revitalization, City of 
Toronto 
Craig Applegath, Principal, DIALOG 
Cherise Burda, then Regional Director, Ontario, Pembina Institute; now Director, City 
Building Institute, Ryerson University 
Richard Joy, Executive Director, ULI Toronto 
Faisal Moola, Director General, Ontario and Northern Canada, David Suzuki Foundation 
Andrew Pietrewicz, Director, Resource Integration, Power System Planning at 
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) 
Brenda Webster, Architecture and Urban Design Consultant  
Yvonne Yeung, Senior Planner, Urban Design, City of Markham  
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Economic Resilience Workshop – Thursday, February 19, 2015 
Damian Dupuy, Manager, Strategic Policy Coordination, Ministry of Economic 
Development, Employment, and Infrastructure, Government of Ontario 
Juan Gomez, then Vice-President, Government Relations and Policy (Acting), Toronto 
Region Board of Trade; now Senior Partner, Policy and Public Affairs, ThinkTank 
Toronto 
Toby Lennox, consultant; formerly Vice President of Strategy Development and 
Stakeholder Relations at the Greater Toronto Airports Authority 
Tom Smith CRX MCIP RPP, Senior Vice President, Development and Leasing, 
SmartCentres Inc. 
Martin Sparrow, Principal, DIALOG 
Matthias Sweet, then Postdoctoral Fellow, McMaster Institute for Transportation and 
Logistics, now Assistant Professor, School of Urban and Regional Planning, Ryerson 
University 
Peter Thoma, Partner, urbanMetrics 
 
Social Resilience Workshop – Friday, February 20, 2015 
Will Dunning, President, Will Dunning Inc., Economic Research 
Renée Gomes, Director, Development, Waterfront Toronto 
Richard Matern, Senior Manager of Research, Daily Bread Food Bank 
Diego Morettin, Principal, DIALOG 
Dennis Raphael, Professor of Health Policy and Management, York University 
Samir Sinha, Director of Geriatrics, Mount Sinai and the University Health Network 
Hospitals and Provincial Lead, Ontario’s Seniors Strategy 
Jocelyn Strutt, Project Manager, Neighbourhood Action Strategy, City of Hamilton 
Shahil Thomas, then Local Economies Developer, Metcalf Foundation; now Manager, 
Toronto Enterprise Fund, United Way of Greater Toronto 
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